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The Content of Coercion
Michael M. Oswalt*
This Article is about a new approach to one of the law's most basic
questions: what is coercion? Under its traditionalframing, coercion is
about transactions. One person makes an offer to another person, who,
under the circumstances, has no realistic option but to say "yes." But that
conception has not helped courts articulate a way to test when pressures
cross the line from lawful persuasion to illegal compulsion. Without a
metric, critics charge that coercion analyses are inevitably normative.
This Article challenges that inevitability. Using the workplace as a case
study, it argues that it is possible to weigh the impact of speech or conduct
on choice, but only if the coercion's content is clarified so thatjudges know
what they are supposed to be evaluating. Drawingfrom rapid advances at
the intersection of decision-making and emotion science, the Article is the
first to describe what it is, exactly, about an external force that might push
employees, their superiors, and consumers toward irrationaljudgments.
The new approach unites labor law with emerging law and emotion
scholarship, applies across existing doctrine, and, by lending itself to
quantifiable assessments, defies normative assumptions to finally
standardize the law of coercion at work.
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INTRODUCTION

This Article is about a new approach to understanding one of the
law's most basic questions: what is coercion? Most accounts start from
the premise that coercion is about transactions. One person makes an
offer to another person, who, under the circumstances, has no realistic
option but to say "yes."' The transactional approach courses through a
remarkable cross-section of American law, 2 and its sheer stability
testifies to its theoretical flexibility.3 It has not, however, helped courts
advance a "coherent rationale" for measuring when a specific offer
constitutes legal coercion and when it amounts to something less.4
Critics contend this gap has turned coercion into an "inevitably
normative" concept, where detecting its presence has become less
about a proposal's impact than "some moral condemnation of the offer
itself."5

This Article challenges that inevitability. But moving coercion away
from a primarily values-based analysis will require a renewed focus on
its substance. Weighing an offer's influence requires in the first
instance a better idea of what it is, exactly, about an unlawful proposal
that pushes someone to do one thing when the rational move would
be to do something else. Without that sense, judges simply do not
know what they are supposed to be evaluating. 6
While coercion's content is relevant anywhere the term is at issue,
this Article localizes the inquiry to the workplace, where the concept
pervades a range of discussions, from forced arbitration, to pressured

I For an especially lucid description of this formula, which in a second step often
requires that the offeror not "have a right to make" the proposal in the first place, see
Benjamin I. Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens
United, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 800, 829-33 (2012) [hereinafter Unions, Corporations,and
Political Opt-Out Rights].
2 Id. at 832 n.170 (listing examples).
3 Kathleen Sullivan's 1989 article still testifies to the variety of approaches to legal
coercion, which broadly involve offers from state and private actors to decisionmakers. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413,
1428-50 (1989).
4 Id. at 1428.
5 Id. at 1446 n.133 (citing commentators in philosophy and law); see also id. at
1443 ("[In these settings [coercion] is inevitably normative, not merely descriptive,
empirical, or psychological. It necessarily embodies a conclusion about the
wrongfulness of a proposal, not merely the degree of constraint it imposes on
choice.").
6 See Sachs, Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights, supra note 1, at
844 ("To be sure, there is no consistency in the Court's jurisprudence on these
questions.").
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political contributions, to compelled prescription-filling. 7 Unions are a
particular flashpoint, with mandatory dues and representation fueling
repeated allegations of coerced speech at the Supreme Court.8
In this Article, the focus is broader and more longstanding: statutory
labor law itself, where coercion sits at the center of how the regime as
a whole seeks to structure relations between employees, their
superiors, and outsiders. All three are routinely bombarded with a
diversity of speech that straddles the line between rationalist
persuasion the law supports and unfair pressure it limits, and labor
law's primary function is to pick a side. Nearly everyone agrees it does
not do this well, with the accustomed complaint: it's all just politics. 9
But if the underlying doctrine has not explained how bad offers
operate, or if the law lacks a consistent metric to examine a proposal's
psychological fallout, a reliance on norms or a sense of justice is
unsurprising. In fact, much of labor law's current approach to
coercion, I contend, relies on analytical proxies that point more to
things that for historical, policy, or contextual reasons judges don't
like than to evidence of genuine choice distortion.
Getting to coercion's content must start with a renewed sense of
how people actually make decisions, from all sides: how workers
decide to support a union or not; how employers decide to recognize a
union or do business with a controversial supplier or not; and how
consumers decide to shop at a store under protest or not. It is a
propitious moment for a return to these kinds of first principles.
Insights from behavioral law and economics, legal neuroscience, and
social psychology have cast seemingly decisive doubt on conventional
7 See, e.g., Alexander Hertel-Fernandez

& Paul Secunda, Citizens Coerced A

Legislative Fix for Workplace Political Intimidation Post-Citizens United, 64 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 2, 6 (2016) [hereinafter Citizens Coerced] (examining "political
coercion in the . .
workplace"); Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute
Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 308 (2004)
(discussing "coerced arbitration" in employment); Lorraine Schmall, Birth Control As
a Labor Law Issue, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 139, 159 (2006) (considering
employees "forced to fill birth control prescriptions, notwithstanding . .
religious
beliefs").
8 See Catherine L. Fisk & Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the
Contradictions of Compelled Speech, 48 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 439, 485-86 (2014).
9 See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26
COMp. LAB. L. & POL'YJ. 221, 249-51 (2005) (describing the Board's "politicization"
and its impact on precedents); Amy Semet, Political Decision-Making at the National
Labor Relations Board. An Empirical Examination of the Board's Unfair Labor Practice
Decisions Through the Clinton and Bush II Years, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 223,
225-26 (2016) ("The NLRB . . is often cited as the poster child for partisanship in
agency decision-making.").
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portraits of cool and detached deciding in everyday life. It is also a
restive moment. Just as notions of skewed choice through
unconscious bias, intuitions, defaults, and other heuristics go
mainstream,' 0 another field is pushing to the front of the line.
In just the past dozen years, emotion science has forced an even
more basic rethinking of how people make judgments. Research has
shown that feelings like sadness, anger, and disgust operate like
viewfinders that selectively distort incoming data and bias responses
accordingly. Decisions made in the throes of an emotion are not, in
other words, "rational" in the traditional sense of pros-versus-cons.
While this is a challenge for any area that, like labor law, assumes a
rationalist baseline even where passions are in play, the newest
research also reveals that the filters and skews are strikingly
predictable. And that means that learning about emotions can
illuminate coercion's inner workings in ways not previously possible.
The danger, however, is that the law will not keep up with the
advances. That anxiety has been articulated by a range of law and
emotions scholars," and it has special resonance in work law, where
the bedrock cases use analytical avoidance or misdirection to sidestep
even seemingly self-evident consequences of facts drenched with
emotions. This includes major coercion precedents. The irony,
though, is that when it comes to the pressures faced by those forced to
make decisions labor law cares about, all the relevant institutions,
from business, to labor, to the National Labor Relations Board
("Board") itself, are nonetheless fixated on one emotion especially:
fear. It is everything employers try to generate, everything unions try
to transform, and everything the Board tries to identify. What has been
missing is a tool to integrate that preoccupation into the law of
coercion.
The tool has been found, and my thesis, drawing from still-maturing
emotion science insights, is that coercion's content is fear. Thanks to
the emergent research, we now know that fear is extraordinarily wellsuited to distort employer, employee, and consumer choice by
10 See Elizabeth Kolbert, Why Facts Don't Change Our Minds, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27,
2017, at 66 ("As everyone who's followed the research - or even occasionally picked
up a copy of Psychology Today - knows, any graduate student with a clipboard can
demonstrate that reasonable-seeming people are often totally irrational.").
11 Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren have made the strongest case against leaving
emotions behind. See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who's Afraid of Law and the
Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1997, 2000 (2010) (responding to "doubts" to "enable
broader application of law and emotions analysis to pressing legal problems"); see also
Carol Sanger, The Role and Reality of Emotions in Law, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
107, 110-13 (2001) (describing a troubling trend of "misuse of emotions in law").
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modifying rationalist processing. Even a dash of the emotion inflates
perceived risks, embeds pessimism, and prompts an uncooperative,
defensive outlook. While conceptualizing coercion as an emotion
trades a focus on transactions for a focus on interpersonal dynamics,
here it is an appropriate switch. That's because work is about
interpersonal dynamics. Paychecks, revenue streams, and reputations
hang in the balance and relational nuances can tip the scale. A
cancelled lunch date, an ominous reference, or even a physical scene
can influence immediate and future choices in subtle but meaningful
ways. The law's conventional approach of boiling a manager's quip or
a union's theatrics down to a take-it-or-leave-it bargain tells very little
of that story.
Of course, fear's power to capture decision-making subtleties also
makes it a challenging regulatory subject. Judges cannot "measure"
fear. They can, however, look at the facts surrounding an encounter
and assess the victim's options to cope with the fright. Rounding a
corner to find yourself face-to-face with a raucous protest might well
be startling, for example. But if you can easily walk right past or
entirely avoid it, the feeling is lessened. Those sorts of "exit" options
underpin the psychological construct of "control," which is like fear's
kryptonite. When things get harrowing, we look for escape hatches,
and the more outlets we perceive, the less fear we feel. What makes
this regulatory gold is that the types of avoidance opportunities that
matter can often be described with specificity and even tested. Control
options are, in an evidentiary sense, countable and therefore
measurable. Conclusions about the coerciveness of an encounter based
on principles of exit need not, therefore, be normative.
The Article has four parts. Part I frames the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA" or "Act") as fundamentally about decisionmaking and interventions into decision-making. Tradition dictates
that valid decisions are "rational" decisions, and Part II serves as an
object lesson on the pitfalls of using "coercion" to police rationality
absent a sense of what coercion "is" or a metric to weigh the impact of
third-party interventions on judgments. Part III starts over, detailing
how far decision-making theory has advanced since the law developed
its approach to regulating coercion, including the fact that judgments
and emotions are inextricably linked. That has long been the Board's
intuition, but it's never had the empirical footing to adequately
integrate the two. Part IV provides the footing. Present-day
developments from emotion science make the case that the content of
coerced workplace decision-making is fear, and that fear can be
measured across actors and contexts through the concept of control.
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The Article concludes by showing how a control-based approach to
analyzing coercion can be integrated across existing labor doctrine.
I.

LABOR LAW AS DECISION-MAKING AND INTERVENTION IN
DECISION-MAKING

The tale of modern labor law might be thought of as a story about
the right to make decisions, with a subplot about the right to intervene
in those decisions developed in the second chapter. What today we
call the NLRA started out in July 1935 as the Wagner Act, passed for
the "high purpose" of a "better relationship between labor and
management" through the right to pick a union at work. 12 in a
numbers-sense, the system worked -

and worked quickly -

with

labor's ranks swelling from three to fifteen million in just a decade or
so post-passage.1 3 From management's perspective, the success itself
was evidence of a skewed selection system, and after failing to have
the law declared unconstitutional, 4 the business community took a
different tack by pushing to have the Wagner Act amended. The
argument was straightforward: the boss deserves a say in the process.' 5
It was also successful. Following a post-World War II strike wave that
crippled major segments of the economy and turned public and
political opinion, Congress beat back a Presidential veto to pass the
employer-friendly Taft-Hartley Act.16
12 79 CONG. REc. 10720 (1935). At the time, relations could not have been much
worse, with 1,800 major strikes and over 1.5 million strikers in 1934 alone. See
ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICAN WORKERS, AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920-1985, at 33-34 (1986)
(describing the pre-Wagner era as a time of "lethal bitterness rarely matched in
American history"). For a procedural and substantive accounting of the previous
regime and its role in the Wagner Act's development, see Laura J. Cooper, Letting the
Puppets Speak: Employee Voice in the Legislative History of the Wagner Act, 94 MARQ. L.
REV. 837, 838-44 (2011).
13 See Charles J. Morris, How the National Labor Relations Act Was Stolen and How
It Can Be Recovered: Taft-Hartley Revisionism and the National Labor Relations Board's
Appointment Process, 33 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 21 (2012).
14 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937).
15 As written, the Wagner Act encompassed only union rights, and the early-Board
required employer neutrality throughout the organizing and representation process.
See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First
Amendment, 16 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 366-67 (1995). Suggested changes thus
focused on liberalizing employer interventions into what was seen as a "one-sided"
statute. See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 32 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al. eds., 6th ed.
2012); see also Story, supra, at 378-80 ("[Clompanies had been complaining since as
far back as 1939 that the Board didn't respect their First Amendment rights.").
16 See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION: A CENTURY OF AMERICAN LABOR
115 (2002); ZIEGER, supranote 12, at 108-09.

0

1592

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 52:1585

The immediate result of the legislative whipsaw was to allow
employer intervention into employee decision-making.' 7 The lasting
consequence, however, was a fundamentally hybridized statute that
protects the right to freely choose as it also defends the right to freely
meddle, setting the stage for a conundrum that has haunted labor law
ever since: how much free speech is too much for free choice?' 8 The
question is a perpetual tension at NLRB, where debates swirl around
whether the Act's postwar legislative history forces the agency into a
neutral posture that protects management's right to decry collective
bargaining as vigorously as it safeguards labor's right to round-up
support - or whether it's untouched prewar purpose to "encourage"
bargaining triggers a more organizing-sympathetic framework.' 9 When
scholars brand the Act as a "woeful failure" 20 or note that its
supporters are "in despair," 2 1 the complaint is sometimes structural
and about the law's limited coverage or failure to keep pace with a
changing workplace. 22 But usually it's about a perceived imbalance
between speech and choice that results in lawful interventions that
shouldn't be or unlawful interventions with useless remedies.2 3 And
17 Specifically, section 8(c), 61 Stat. 136, 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1947),
codified an employer right to persuade during employee organizing.
18 Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law
Exile: Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE LJ.
2013, 2033-34 (2009) (describing the National Labor Relations Act as a fusion of two
laws passed "under diametrically opposed historical circumstances" and "aimed at
correcting diametrically opposed abuses of power"); see also JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN
PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947-1994, at 14 (1995)

(noting the NLRB's "unique position of choosing between different labor policies" in
the same statute).
19 GROSS, supra note 18, at 13-14 (highlighting this "question"); Fisk & Malamud,
supra note 18, at 2035, 2041-43; see also Two Current Board Members Describe
Differing Approaches to Decisionmaking, DAILY LAB. REP., May 27, 2004, at A-10.
20 Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOzo L. REV. 2685,
2694 (2008) [hereinafter Employment Law].
21 Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for
Unorganized Workers, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 59, 59 (1993).
22 See James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective BargainingProtections and the
Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 939, 942 (1996) (calling the Act "largely
irrelevant to the contemporary workplace"); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of
American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2002) ("The core of American
labor law has been essentially sealed off . .. from democratic revision and renewal.");
Sachs, Employment Law, supra note 20, at 2697-700 (describing the Act's many
exclusions).
23 See, e.g., Cesar F. Rosado-Marzan, Organizing with International Framework
Agreements: An Exploratory Study, 4 UC IRVINE L. REv. 725, 737-38 (2014) ("American
labor law is . .. too permissive of employer misconduct and fails to provide adequate
means to police the slim protections that it does afford to workers."); Paul C. Weiler,

0
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when labor repeatedly tries to amend the Act, and business repeatedly
tries to stop it, it's primarily because labor dislikes the rules of
intervention and business is pretty well fine with them.24
Absent a third statutory overhaul, the philosophical push-pull
underlying the lawfulness of choice interference is not going to be
settled. But if the analyses were fastened to specific and, especially,
measurable standards, perhaps differing takes on legislative history
would be beside the point. Taking an initial step down that road
requires a basic understanding of both the law's principle decisional
pivots and its theory of legitimate decision-making.
A.

DecisionalPoints in Modern Labor Law

While the process of establishing a union can vary across
campaigns, in nearly every instance workers and employers are
confronted with some common choices. For employees, the first
decisional point is whether to even get involved. The question is often
teed up by a knock on the front door, where a professional union
organizer and sometimes a work colleague await with an exercise that
is both educational and diagnostic. 25 They want to talk about job
issues and the budding campaign, but they also want to assess the
potential voter's level of sympathy and, if the early returns are positive,
ask if she'd like to help out.26 At this stage the campaign is more or
less underground, but from informally spreading the word, to going
on "house visits" like this one, to joining the "organizing committee"
that will set the agenda going forward, there are a number of
opportunities to pitch in. 27

Early interest or not, the next decision is very concrete: to sign or
not to sign. Starting the NLRB's unionization machinery requires that
Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1787-803 (1983) (describing the Board's traditional remedies and
their inadequacies).
24 See Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the
Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REv. 655, 657-58 (2010) [hereinafter Enabling
Employee Choice] (stating that the "central substantive question raised by [recent
legislative] debate . . . is whether it is appropriate for federal law to enable employees
and unions to minimize, or avoid entirely, managerial intervention").
25 See id. at 664-65.
26 See id. "[lInformal assessments," where organizers "rate workers on union
support scales," are a key aspect of these early encounters. Seth Newton Patel, Have
We Built the Committee? Advancing LeadershipDevelopment in the U.S. Labor Movement,
16 WORKINGUSA:J. LAB. & Soc. 113, 116-17 (2013).
27 Patel, supra note 26, at 114-15; see also Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice, supra
note 24, at 665.

[Vol. 52:1585

University of California, Davis

1594

-

at least thirty percent of the relevant workforce show "interest" in a
secret ballot to elect (or reject) a representative by signing an index
card or a petition.2 8 If the union is successful, the Board notifies the
employer, some bureaucracy ensues, and an election date is set.29 The
effort is now "public," and a race to persuade employees to vote for or
against collective bargaining - that is to say, to intervene in choice
begins. 30
The politicking culminates on election day, as both sides push to get
their presumed allies to the polls, which is usually a quiet room
somewhere on the job site with a box for paper slips that present
workers with their highest-profile decision: "Yes" for representation or
"No" for the status quo. 3 1 The union needs fifty percent plus one of
the ballots cast to win.32 If the math works out, the Board certifies it as
the negotiating representative for every employee in the applicable
"unit," and the employer is then obligated to sit down and negotiate. If
the union loses, workers cannot vote again for at least a year.33
The process has innumerable variations, and even if it follows this
script, employees face many other decisions across and outside of the
timeline. Workers are also consumers and may have to decide whether
to honor a boycott or a picket line, for example. One of the most
common deviations from the traditional progression brings employer
decision-making into view. An employer can short-circuit the formal
election step by deciding to immediately "recognize" the union if it
has been presented with proof - usually, again, in the form of
signatures that a majority of all employees already want a
representative. 34 Since collective bargaining is rarely an employer's
28 See 29 C.F.R. § 101.27(a)(3) (2018).
29 See Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice, supra note 24, at 665-66. Unless parties
are able to stipulate to central aspects of the upcoming election, like the time, place,
and eligible voters, the bureaucracy revolves primarily around hearings, which have
traditionally been a source of great delay. § 102.62(b); see also Jeffrey M. Hirsch,
NLRB Elections: Ambush or Anticlimax?, 64 EMORY L.J. 1647, 1652-53 (2015). In 2014,
the NLRB reformed its procedures to streamline the process, id. at 1649-50, and the
current Board has signaled its intention to reverse the changes. See 82 Fed. Reg.
58783-01, 58785 (Dec. 14, 2017) (requesting "information from the public
regarding ...
amendments to the Board's representation case procedures adopted by
the Board's final rule published on December 15, 2014").
30 Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice, supra note 24, at 666.
31

See

NLRB,

NLRB

CASEHANDLING

MANUAL,

PART

Two,

REPRESENTATION

PROCEEDINGS § 11302.2 (2017) (describing "the employer's premises" as "the best
place to hold an election"); id. § 11340.4 (describing voting procedures).
32 See id. § 11470.
33 See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (2018).
34 Rosado-Marzan, supra note 23, at 737-38.
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preferred approach to workforce relations, unions often use protest
tactics to make this a choice between recognition and continued
public shaming instead of recognition or not. 3 5 A popular modification
retains the protest but pushes instead for intermediate steps like a
commitment to remain neutral in the lead-up to an election or to give
organizers more access to the workplace than is otherwise required by
law. 36

B.

Idealizing Decision-Making

These prime decisional points are, on paper, clear enough. A
threshold issue for labor law has been to come up with a model of
idealized or merely valid decision-making as a baseline to clarify the
kinds of facts suggesting that an intervention has forced an
unacceptable deviation. The issue is trickier than it might seem. The
statute is effectively silent on the matter,3 7 and the fused legislative
histories resolve little about what constitutes an informed - but not
unfairly informed - electorate. Thus, whether a human resources
director who hears workers discussing unionization and interrupts
with her own take enhances or degrades decision-making depends on
an organizing versus speech tug-of-war that can be grounded in
congressional transcripts but not obviously resolved by them. 38
The gap has been partially filled by a consensus that has both
surface logic and accords with the bulk of conventional legal thought
over the last seventy years: 39 a worker's choice to organize a union or
vote against one; a consumer's decision to support a boycott; a
company's choice to press another company to settle a strike; or really
any decision made by anyone having anything to do with a labor law
35 See Roger C. Hartley, Non-Legislative Law Reform and Pre-Recognition Labor
Neutrality Agreements: The Newest Civil Rights Movement, 22 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L.
369, 387 (2001).
36 See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption: Making Labor Law in Cities and

States, 124 HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1169-70 (2011) [hereinafter Despite Preemption].
37 While the Act grants some "special privileges" to representation choices made
in secret, through a ballot-box, the Supreme Court has granted equal legitimacy to
choices made publicly, in the presence of a co-worker or organizer. NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 595-99 (1969).
38 In 2005, a Board majority thought such conduct was "rude, but . .
not
unlawful" since the employer's right to intervene - and even interrupt - with antiunion opinions was intended to spark "robust debate." Aladdin Gaming, LLC, 345
N.L.R.B. 585, 586-87 (2005). The dissent said interrupting workers would make them
feel surveilled and discourage worker-to-worker discussions. See id. at 589 (Liebman,
Member, dissenting).
39 Robin West, Law's Emotions, 19 RICHMONDJ.L. & PUB. INT. 339, 340 (2016).
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subject, should be rational."0 Early on, influential academics like
Derek Bok offered lucid depictions of what, for employees at least, that
should mean:
[A] rational decision implies that employees have access to
relevant information, that they use this data to determine the
possible consequences of selecting or rejecting the union, and
that they appraise these possibilities in light of their own
values and desires to determine whether a vote for the union
promises to promote or impair their interests. 1
And while other scholars continue to grapple with the best
representative appointment apparatus, the disagreements are mostly
about inputs that arguably taint free choice, not the goal of rationality
itself.4 2 At one end are works by Paul Weiler and Craig Becker, who

encourage sharp limits on the role of employers in decision-making by
shortening the public campaign period or by removing their standing
to impact administrative procedures. Both acknowledge there must
nevertheless be space for workers to mull employer-generated content
before votes are cast - so long as it is not presented in a way that
corrupts reasoned judgment.4 3 At another end are those who push for
4o Brishen Rogers has summarized the approach well: "Board members and judges
have frequently adopted a particular model of the proper preconditions for
autonomous choice: . . . calm, rational, and individualized." Brishen Rogers, Passion
and Reason in Labor Law, 47 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 313, 321 (2012); see also Sachs,
Enabling Employee Choice, supra note 24, at 686 ("[Tlhe commitment to employee
'free' choice reflects the idea that employees' choices on the question of unionization
should be autonomous.").
41 Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 38, 46 (1964).
42 A good example would be Brishen Rogers' critique of longstanding choice
doctrine that nevertheless tries to show how "disruptive action is consistent with,
rather than threatening to, worker autonomy." Rogers, supra note 40, at 364. An
exception would be Mark Barenberg's proposal for the converse of the current system,
a "default state of unionization" where collective bargaining would serve as the
baseline relationship between labor and management. Mark Barenberg, Democracy and
Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible
Production,94 COLUM. L. REv. 753, 960 (1994).
43 Weiler's reform involves an "instant" election that would take place a few days
after the showing of interest. Weiler, supra note 23, at 1770, 1812. Becker's suggestion
is to eliminate employers' status as parties to representation cases, barring them from
participating in the bureaucratic run-up to the election and shifting control over
voting procedures to unions. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union
Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 585-94 (1993)
[hereinafter Union Representation]. Both agree there is utility in allowing workers to
weigh all sides prior to voting, either as a normative good or as consistent with a
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a much freer flow of information, and again, the argument is that
rationality demands it.44 The proposals range from abolishing most of
the law's existing limits on employer persuasion,45 to mandating
certain data disclosures, 46 to maximizing the number of days available
for campaigning. 47 Less has been said with respect to choices made by
employers and consumers during unionization, but the crux of
modern commentary has been criticism of a judicial tendency to
declare decisions to observe boycotts or to recognize unions as tainted
with unfair influence where facts point just as plausibly to the
existence of meaningful deliberation and genuine persuasion. 48
For its part, the Board too has concluded that good decisions are
rational decisions,4 9 but it has done so by reference to two analogies.
Its "express paradigm" is for electoral picks to reflect "uninhibited
desires" of the sort that would emerge from an "experiment"50 in a
"coherent theory" of free choice. Becker, Union Representation, supra, at 592; see
Weiler, supra note 23, at 1814-15.
4 The case has been made most robustly by Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the
Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REv. 1, 4-5, 45-47 (2008), who built
significantly on Derek Bok's earlier suggestions for a better-informed electorate. See
Bok, supra note 41, at 50 ("[T]he decision which the employee must make is difficult
because it requires a prediction concerning the effects of an institution that is
generally quite foreign to his experience."). In the middle are plans for online, phone,
and mail balloting, which seek to elicit reasoned preferences by maximizing voting
confidentiality while limiting, but not eliminating, employer perspectives. See William
B. Gould, New Labor Law Reform Variations on an Old Theme: Is the Employee Free
Choice Act the Answer?, 70 LA. L. REV. 1, 13-17 (2009); Sachs, Enabling Employee
Choice, supra note 24, at 712-13.
45 In an important and controversial early study, Julius G. Getman and others
examined over thirty representation elections and arrived at the counterintuitive
conclusion that employer influence has relatively little impact on voting preferences.
See JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 6264, 140 (1976). From this perspective, the proper administrative course is thus
deregulation combined with a union-side equal time requirement to counterbalance
management's control of the work setting. See id. at 150-57.
46 See Bodie, supra note 4444, at 72-73.
47 See Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Limiting Information in the Information Age: The
NLRB's Misguided Attempt to Squelch Employer Speech, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 473, 485, 501
(2013).
48 See infra notes 138-58 and accompanying text.
49 To be specific, the Board has said that "[a]n election can serve its true purpose
only if the surrounding conditions enable employees to register a free and
untrammeled choice for or against a bargaining representative." General Shoe Corp.,
77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948); see also Bodie, supra note 4444, at 4 ("The Board
implicitly assumes that the campaign ...

will generate . .. an informed and rational

decision.").
50 Bodie, supra note 4444, at 8, 15. The standard was developed in General Shoe
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"sterile" lab. 51 Of course, absent extreme and sustained regulation, it is
essentially unworkable to apply a "standard of pristine fairness" to a
contest over an idea that, at base, implicates power, money, and deeply
personal allegiances.52 For that reason, the Board and courts
frequently lapse into an earlier comparator with a more rough-andtumble pedigree, the political campaign.53 While the political sphere
evokes the lively rhetorical sparring one might expect from a union
drive, it also shares very little with the world of white coats and
Bunsen burners.5 4 This friction, like the dissonance at the heart of the
Act's purposes, has not been resolved, and the models predictably have
"an uneasy coexistence" in case law and in briefs, with practitioners
and academics urging the adoption of pro- or anti-interventionist
takes based on one analogy or the other.5 5 Craig Becker has played on
this reality by labeling the agency's true conceit "a laboratory for
democracy."56

The Board has avoided analogy when it comes to employer and
consumer decision-making, but labs and politics have done little to
clarify the scope of corrupting influences in the electoral space,5 7 so it
is probably not a missed opportunity. Moreover, if there is general
agreement that the overall objective is rationality, the Board can turn
to the statute for assistance in analyzing the all-important next step,
determining when decision-making has become irrational. Here, we
get to the question of coercion.
II.

CORRUPTED CHOICES: UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW COERCION

The term "coerce" appears four times in the Act, twice in the
context of employee choice,58 once in the context of employer and
Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. at 127.
51 Becker, Union Representation, supra note 43, at 550.
52 Id. at 548. It was therefore somewhat strange, then, that in announcing the
standard the Board also stated that it would be breached only "in the rare extreme
case." General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. at 127.
53 See Bodie, supra note 44, at 15-17 (noting that the political analogy reaches
back to democratic values that animated the Wagner Act).
5 See Becker, Union Representation, supra note 43, at 550-51.
55 Bodie, supra note 44, at 25-34; see also Becker, Union Representation, supra note
43, at 548 (describing the Board as "[v]eering back and forth between metaphors of
science and politics").
56 Becker, Union Representation, supra note 43, at 548.
57 See, e.g., id. at 552 ("General Shoe generated a complex and contradictory body
of doctrine."); Bodie, supra note 44, at 17.
58 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (b)(1) (2018).
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consumer choice, 59 and once outside of the immediate decisionmaking realm, in reference to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service. 60 Though the existence of coercion as a choice-disruptive
phenomenon is central in philosophy and legal theory, 61 applying
those insights to "legal doctrine has not succeeded in producing a
coherent jurisprudence." 62 Given the term's "ubiquit[y]" this, as Mark
Greenberg has argued, poses a "major burden" in most specialties. 63
On this account, labor law may be better than most. While lacking a
substantive definition of coercion, the NLRA at least lists some
generalized bad acts. 64 But it has not translated to good results. When
worker decision-making is at issue, the law tends to be, in dramatic
fashion, under-inclusive, deeming interventions consistent with
rational judgment when they probably are not. When the analysis
involves employer decision-making the law tends to be, even more
dramatically, over-inclusive, identifying coercion's presence and
forecasting irrational decision-making on thin facts. Because coercion
operates like a legal "light switch" 65 - if it's off, decisions are rational,
if it's on, they are not - these are problems of kind, not degree, and
the consequences are significant.
Below, I examine these issues, dealing first with the coercion of
employees by employers and unions in sections 8(a)(1) and
8(b)(1)(a), and then turning to coercive labor pressure on employers
59 § 158(b)(4)(ii).
60 § 173(c) (referring to "coercion").
61 See Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 425
(2011) ("[T]he concept of coercion has been a source of great concern for political,
moral, and legal philosophers.").
62 Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEx. L. REV. 717, 779
(2005); see also Sachs, Unions, Corporations,and Political Opt-Out Rights, supra note 1,
at 830 ("[T]he Court has never provided an adequate theory of coercion .... );
rulings display serious
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1428 ("[Tihe Court's ...
inconsistencies in their account of coercion."). For some classic attempts, see ALAN
WERTHEIMER, COERCION 5 (1987) (depicting coercion's function throughout the law);
Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1489-505 (offering a "systemic account" of coercive,
unconstitutional conditions). For more recent attempts, see, e.g., Hiba Hafiz, Beyond
Liberty: Toward a History and Theory of Economic Coercion, 83 TENN. L. REv. 1071
(2016); Kim, supra note 61, at 436-74; Susan S. Kuo & Benjamin Means, Collective
Coercion, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1599 (2016).
63 Mark Greenberg, How to Explain Things with Force the Force of Law, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1932, 1977 (2016) (reviewing Fredrick Schauer, The Force of Law (2015)).
64 The Act's sections 8(a) and 8(b) provisions amount to a list of illegal employer
and union acts, respectively. See, e.g., § 158(a)(4) (coercing employees for "fil[ing]
charges or giv[ing] testimony under this Act"); § 158(b)(2) (coercing employees by
"caus[ing] an employer to discriminate against" them).
65 Story, supranote 15, at 408.
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and consumers in section 8(b)(4)(ii). While these areas have been
subject to extensive treatment over the years, it has generally involved
claims that the law has placed certain types of conduct into the wrong
"coercive" or "non-coercive" box. That may often be so, but this part
highlights a more basic issue that previous treatments have not
examined in detail: the law has never developed a metric to assess the
impact of acts that potentially harm rationality.66 Given the hybrid
nature of the statute, it is no surprise that a weights and measures void
in this area results in a body of decisional law that, reflecting the
standard complaint, feels "inescapably normative." 67 But here my
bigger aim is to show that if there is no scale to test the severity of
intrusions into free choice, "coercion" - the core theoretical pivot
underlying all questions of labor law decision-making - can't work.
A.

Employee Coercion and the Issue of Ill-Measurement

The Act deals expressly with the coercion of worker choice in two
places. Section 8(a)(1) makes it illegal for an employer "to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees," and section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it
illegal for a union to "restrain or coerce" workers. Both limit
prohibited conduct to things that obstruct the activities listed in
section 7, which encompasses all the decisional points discussed, from
talking about or campaigning for or against a union, to signing or not
signing a card, to even tweeting in support of a better workplace
generally. 68 Though sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) refer additionally
to restraint (and section 8(a)(1) also to interference), "coercion"
66 To be clear, Derek Bok and Craig Becker have raised similar concerns with
respect to the Board's treatment of employee choice during the campaign period,
which sometimes implicates section 8(a)(1) coercion. See, e.g., Becker, Union
Representation, supra note 43, at 592 ("[T]he ostensible focus of Board campaign law
is employee free choice, but the Board lacks a coherent theory for judging the impact
of a myriad of campaign tactics."); Bok, supra note 41, at 40-43 (complaining that the
Board's electoral standard "will hardly provide a workable basis for arriving at
consistent decisions, for we know so little about the effects of many campaign
tactics"); see also infra text accompanying note 79 (noting the lower "laboratory
conditions" standard at play in electoral contexts). My contention is that far from
being limited to that specific context, coercion's measurement problem extends to all
of labor law.
67 Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1446.
68 Section 7 generally protects employee protest or unionization activities that
occur "collectively" and "for the purpose of. . . mutual aid or protection." § 157. It
also protects the "right to refrain from any or all of such activities." Id. For an
overview of section 7's breadth, see Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mkts., 361 N.L.R.B.
No. 12, 2014 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 627, at *10-12 (Aug. 11, 2014).
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functions as a rhetorical catch-all denoting any degree of unlawful
meddling with free choice. In other words, if management delivers an
illegal anti-union harangue or illegally spies, or if a union interrogates
a worker in some unlawful way, no careful parsing of restraint versus
interference versus coercion is necessary. 69 Usually it's all just called
coercive. 70
And what the Board intends coercion to mean, in broad strokes, is
that an employer or union has overcome a worker's free will, such that
the choice to do something has been compelled by a power dynamic,
not persuasion.7 1 This is basically consistent with the sense intended

&

69 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 66-67 (2008)
("[N]othing in the NLRA prohibits an employer 'from expressing its view on labor
policies or problems' unless the employer's speech 'in connection with other
circumstances amounts to coercion within the meaning of the Act."' (citing NLRB v.
Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941))); NLRB v. Gormac Custom
Mfg., 190 F.3d 742, 750 (6th Cir. 1999) (describing the inquiry into unlawful union
questioning of employee allegiances as whether the conduct "in fact was coercive");
Aladdin Gaming, LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 585, 586 (2005) (stating the "[i]ndicia of
coerciveness" at play in the test for unlawful section 8(a)(1) surveillance); Babcock
Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 595 (1948) ("If [statements] constitute a violation of the
Act, it is because coercion is to be imputed to them . . . ."); see also Bodie, supra note
44, at 8 (summarizing the varieties of illegal election conduct succinctly, as
"coercion"). For a new (and contested) possible exception, see Harborside Healthcare,
343 N.L.R.B. 906, 916 (2004) (Liebman, Member, dissenting) (criticizing the majority
for inserting the term "interfere" into a test that previously referenced only "coercion,"
without explaining "what sort of conduct might fall in this category or why it would
be objectionable").
70 This practice is consistent with the lgislative history, where, as Charles C.
Jackson and Jeffrey S. Heller have shown, the three terms were given no "special"
meaning, prompted little discussion, and were "treated as well-established legal
concepts that had been employed in earlier labor and nonlabor legislation." Charles C.
Jackson & Jeffrey S. Heller, Promises and Grants of Benefits Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 37-40 & n.163 (1982). In those contexts,
interference, restraint, and coercion all "invariably involved efforts by employers to
create a fear of reprisals . . . if employees did not accede to the employer's wishes." Id.
at 39-40. To the extent courts provided specific definitions in non-labor cases, each
involved the disruption of employee free will or choice through fear or active and
unreasonable pressure. See id. at 40 (offering judicial definitions, all implicating
corrupted will); see also id. at 40 n.163 ("[Tihe addition of the term 'restraint' was not
intended to add anything significant to" interference and coercion.).
71 In a dated but still famous formulation, the Supreme Court has characterized
workplace coercion as persuasion to which "other things are added." Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945); see also Chauffeurs, Local 663 v. NLRB, 509 F.2d
490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (stressing the importance, in the context of both sections
8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A), of distinguishing "between employer attempts to persuade
workers of the disadvantages of unionization and employer attempts to use their
economic power to 'coerce' workers into voting against the union"). For scholars,
coercion's meaning is similar, the use of "superior ... power to compel employees,"
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in section 8(a)(1), where legislators wanted coercion to be interpreted
literally, not "in an exotic or strained manner," but in contrast to
"influence," a term that had been included in an older bill and was
"bitterly attacked" for its alleged potential to outlaw "peaceful
persuasion." 72 It also accords with section 8(b)(1)(A), which emerged

from a Taft-Hartley floor amendment to mirror section 8(a)(1). 73

While a further amendment removed section 8(b)(1)(A)'s "interfere
with," it was for fear that conservative judges would take advantage of
the less evocative phrase to "defeat legitimate attempts at labor
organization" and eventually target wills convinced, instead of wills
contorted.74 From there a reciprocal sense of coercion itself generally
remained.7 5
Defining coercion in the abstract, however, is not the issue. The
trouble arises when the Board tries to identify it in the real world, yet
does not have a way to measure it. I survey this reality below,
beginning with section 8(a)(1) and then turning to section 8(b)(1)(A).
1.

8(a)(1)

Analyzing coercion under section 8(a)(1) requires the Board to
struggle with Taft-Hartley's gloss in section 8(c) that the "expressing
Jackson & Heller, supra note 70, at 40, or "speech that 'overrides' the employee's
'will,"' Story, supra note 15, at 409 (quoting Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of
Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568 (1930)).
72 Jackson & Heller, supra note 70, at 40-41, 37-38.
73 See Roger C. Hartley, Reconceiving the Role of Section 8(B)(1)(A) - 1947-1997:
An Essay on Collective Empowerment and the Public Good, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 825, 871

(1998). According to the amendment's sponsor, its purpose was "simply to provide
that where unions, in their organizational campaigns, indulge in practices which, if an
employer indulged in them, would be unfair labor practices .. . the union also shall be
guilty of unfair labor practices." Nat'l Mar. Union of Am., 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 983
(1948).

74 Nat'l Mar. Union of Am., 78 N.L.R.B. at 983 ("The words 'to interfere with' were
deleted from the amendment . . [for] fear that these words 'could easily be construed
to mean that any conversation, any persuasion, any urging on the part of any person,
in an effort to persuade another to join a labor organization, would constitute an
unfair labor practice."'); Morris, supra note 13, at 25-26; see JAMES B. ATELSON, VALUES
AND AssUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw 44 (1983) (noting that union advocates,
"relying on past judicial behavior," long believed that "courts could not be trusted to
interpret concepts such as 'coercion' if they were applied to the activities of labor
organizations").
75 As explained in Part II.A.2, the equivalence was short-lived. See Randell
Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 591, 595 (2006) ("[T]he legislative history

of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that Congress intended similar standards to apply to
like kinds of employer and union intimidation.").
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shall not constitute or be

evidence of an unfair labor practice . . . if such expression contains no

'

threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."7 6 Though this new
provision was intended to clarify section 8(a)(1) analyses,7 7 whether
section 8(c) immunized all employer content that did not contain an
explicit threat, or whether facially non-threatening speech could,
considering the circumstances, nevertheless coerce, tied courts into
knots.78
In the short term, the Board dealt with the issue by concluding that
by referencing only unfair labor practices, section 8(c) had nothing to
say about election proceedings, freeing it to safeguard "laboratory
conditions" in voting even if the regulated conduct was not an obvious
threat, payoff, or other set of facts that might rise to the level of
8(a)(1) coercion.7 9 The longer term issues were seemingly resolved in
1969's Gissel Packing, when the Supreme Court stated definitively that
context matters.80 In particular, "economic dependence" matters.8
Workers cannot be considered objective listeners because they're
bound to "pick up" things "that might be more readily dismissed by"
people who are not relying on the speaker for their next house
payment. 82 Nonetheless, section 8(c)'s assurances of free speech
76 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (2018).

77 See Chamber of Commerce

v. Brown, 554 U.S. 60, 67-68 (2008); ROBERT A.
213-14 (John E.

GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LABOR LAW ANALYSIS AND ADVOCACY

Higgins, Jr. ed., 2012).
78 Compare NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 1968) (rejecting the
the
argument that because "statements considered separately are lawful . .
combination of them could not result in illegal conduct" where the "totality of the
circumstances" suggested the existence of coercion), with NLRB v. TRWSemiconductors, Inc., 385 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1967) (finding employer statements
without literal threats to "fall squarely within the protection of section 8(c), even
though they might well produce, in the minds of employees, fears of violence").
79 Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962); see General Shoe
Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 n.10 (1948) ("Congress only applied the new Islection
8(c) to unfair labor practice cases. Matters which are not available to prove a violation
of law, and therefore impose a penalty ... may still be pertinent, if extreme enough, in
determining whether an election satisfies the Board's own administrative standards.").
That stated, "[c]onduct violative of [slection 8(a)(1) is, a fortiori, conduct which
interferes with the exercise of a free and untrammeled choice" under "laboratory
conditions," Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1786-87, unless "it is virtually
impossible to conclude" the unfair labor practices "could have affected the election
results." Safeway, Inc., 338 N.L.R.B. 525, 527 (2002).
s0 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).

8' Id.
82 Id. at 617-18. The same theme is found in the Court's treatment of section 8(c)'s
"promise of benefit" exception five years earlier in NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375
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required some safe harbors,8 3 and the Court found two: opinions
about unionism or a specific union were okay, as were gloomy
predictions about the impact of collective bargaining - but only if the
alleged side-effects were both out of the employer's control and
capable of "demonstrabl[e]" proof through "objective fact."84

Suggestions about actions executives "may or may not take . .. solely

on [their] own initiative" were just threats.8 5
But as the years have shown, and as the literature stresses, the Board
has been unable to translate Gissel's guidance into a satisfactory
system for probing coercion in the real world. 86 The most
comprehensive critique is Alan Story's, who argues that the Board has
come to rely on analytical short-cuts that short-change the decisive
impact of work culture on employees' ears. Too often the Board adopts
hyper-literal postures or presumes that threats are disinfected by
"magic phrases" somewhere in the mix without any basis for
concluding that a quip can overcome a broader message of impending
doom. 87 A tale of workers who unionized and promptly "lost . . . their
jobs" gets purified into opinion - what "could happen," not "what
would happen" - by a supervisor's aside that, well, "each set of
negotiations is different."8 8

U.S. 405, 409 n.3 (1964). There, the Court warned that an employer's conferral of

benefits in response to incipient unionization disrupts free choice because it
underscores workers' implicit reliance on management for their livelihood:
"Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits now
conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry
up if it is not obliged." Id. at 409. So situated, workers are unable to separate gifts and
promised gifts from fears that it all goes away if management's preferences are
ignored. This, the Court famously declared, is the unlawful "fist inside the velvet
glove." Id.
83 See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966)
("[Section] 8(c) manifests a congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues
dividing labor and management.").
84 Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618.
85 Id. at 618-19.
86 See, e.g., Kate E. Andrias, A Robust Public Debate: Realizing Free Speech in the
Workplace Representation Elections, 112 YALE LJ. 2415, 2435 (2003) ("Labor scholars
have strenuously and extensively critiqued [Gissel's conception of] coercion."); Story,
supra note 15, at 414 ("NLRB and the judicial decisions reveal a striking reluctance to
label a wide range of employer conduct as coercive.").
87 Story, supra note 15, at 423-25 (discussing Mt. Ida Footwear Co., 217 N.L.R.B.
1011, 1011-12 (1975), where warning workers that signing cards can be "fatal to a
business" was "sanitized" by the addendum "we are here to stay").
88 Manhattan Crowne Plaza Town Park Hotel Corp., 341 N.L.R.B. 619, 619-20
(2004).
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It is easy for advocates to become disillusioned with these and other
conclusions, either because they agree with Story's commentary on the
Board's methods or because of his larger point that, really, everything's
coercive, because employers have all the power, all the time.89 But
whether the Board could be doing a better job examining words,
images, and metaphors in context, or whether the workplace is really
just a big coercion box, a deeper doctrinal gap has been lurking for a
long time. Gissel never provided means for judges to measure the
degree to which a speech or a situation endangers a worker's capacity
for rational decision-making. There is no way to test, in other words,
whether an opinion, promise, prediction, or even threat has genuinely
distorted free will. Without that, it is difficult to make a persuasive or
stable case that, for example, a worker's choice to kick an organizer off
the front stoop following a union-related talking-to from a supervisor
the day before was the product of informed logic or unlawful
distortion.
Some proof of this lack of metric comes directly from the Board and
courts, where outside of the obvious cases everyone seems to agree
that determining whether someone has been coerced is pretty much a
toss-up. 90 A leading treatise refers to "the inescapable elasticity of the
Gissel guidelines" and concludes, "consistency is not attainable." 9
Much of the difficulty can be traced back to the Board's tendency to
use a totality of the circumstances approach. 92 This is consistent with
Gissel's embrace of context, 93 but the results expose the lack of an
identifiable barometer for coercion, as the agency is forced to resort to
89 See infra notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
90 See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 204 v. NLRB, 506
F.3d 1078, 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("[W]e acknowledge that the record could be read
differently.... Here, the Board determined that threats were neither intended nor
understood. Had the Board reached the opposite conclusion, we likely would have
deferred to that determination as well."); Allied/Egry Business Systems Inc., 169
N.L.R.B. 514, 514 (1968) ("[Iln all cases such as this one, where one must attempt to
fathom the meaning of another's words and assess the impress of such words on
employees, reasonable men may differ. . . .").
91 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 15, at 145, 154.
92 See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 77, at 226.
93 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) ("Any assessment of
the precise scope of employer expression . . . must be made in the context of its labor
relations setting."); NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 478 (1941)
(investigating employer coercion requires accounting for the "totality of the
Company's activities," including what "the Company said as well as what it has
done").
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proxies that point to workplace auras but do not actually drill down
on the basic issue of decision-making integrity.
An example is the treatment of employer warnings that a union will
bring the company "serious harm" or that the starting point for
bargaining will be "from scratch," meaning state and federal
minimums. If it had a set method for measuring coercion, an obvious
way the Board might approach these cases would be to apply that
standard to the statements in context to judge their effect on rational
thought directly. Tellingly, the agency generally does not do that.
Instead, it frequently uses unrelated conduct as a surrogate, requiring
workers to point to independent unfair labor practices first and then
show that this other conduct has produced a cloud that colors the
actual speech at issue in a "darker hue." 94 The First Circuit, for

example, has read the agency's precedent to say that scratch
bargaining statements can be coercive only if coupled with an already
adjudicated illegality, no matter the context overall.95 On one hand,
this approach artificially limits coercion to situations where others
have been administratively vigilant. But more importantly, it shifts the
inquiry away from the core issue of how specific language has
constrained workers' wills and into questions about the length of
shadows cast by some other sort of misconduct. 96
94 See NLRB v. Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc., 398 F.2d 414, 417 (4th Cir. 1968);

see also Greensboro Hosiery Mills, Inc., 162 N.L.R.B 1275, 1276 (1967) ("We have not
ordinarily found such notices to be illegal in and of themselves, for the bare words, in
the absence of conduct or other circumstances supplying a particular connotation, can
be given a noncoercive and nonthreatening meaning. Even the simultaneous existence
of other unfair labor practices may not render the notice coercive, unless these
practices tend to impart a coercive overtone to the notice.").
95 See Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 34, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1989)
(extensively canvassing Board precedent on scratch bargaining statements and
concluding that "the cases draw a boundary between the lawful and unlawful" based
on the presence of other unfair labor practices); see also Exxon Research & Eng'g Co.
v. NLRB, 89 F.3d 228, 232-33 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding the same).
96 A good example is NLRB v. Aerovox Corp. of Myrtle Beach, S.C., 435 F.2d 1208,
1211 (4th Cir. 1970), where the Fourth Circuit considered whether a "'serious harm'
statement amounted to a threat" based on the retroactive impact of a coercive letter
sent to employees two months later. While it could be argued that the tendencies in
this area reflect a stable conclusion that "scratch" and "serious harm" statements
generally do not have a coercive impact in isolation, the Board has occasionally found
section 8(a)(1) violations based on the intensity of the surrounding atmosphere but
without reference to the impact of other ULPs. See, e.g., Eldorado Tool, Inc., 325
N.L.R.B. 222, 222, 235 (1997) (finding the statement, "If the Union gets in, we start
from scratch, no benefits, no nothing," to alone violate section 8(a)(1)); Somerset
Welding & Steel, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 829, 832 (1994) (stating that "scratch" statements
are potentially lawful unless "made in a coercive context"). Overall, considering
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Another principle the Board has used as a proxy for coercion is
"place." Coercion is automatic if supervisors visit an employee at
home.9 7 At work and during the sensitive election period, the
coerciveness of an individualized or small group talk that does not
contain an explicit threat has traditionally been mediated by its
proximity to the so-called "locus of final authority," though later cases
also consider workers' sense of familiarity with the locale and the
number of others gathered.9 8 Place is still an important proxy if there
is no election in sight, but even more atmospheric factors are
considered.9 9 While none of these rules offer a direct measure of
coercion, the limits of using place as a proxy in the first instance have
been almost comically underscored by Craig Becker, who has traced
how the authority loci have, over time, inexplicably "wandered
throughout the workplace."oo
But the best proof that the agency can't measure coercion may be
that it continues to green-light management's most indispensable antiunion tool, the so-called "captive audience" meeting, where workers
are required to show up in a room and listen to anti-union speeches. 10 1
coercion in these cases by reference to documented ULPs appears to be most consistent

mode of analysis. See GoRMAN & FINKIN, supra note 77, at 223, 225.
97 Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 47 (2000)
(citing Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 547 (1957)).
98 See Becker, Union Representation, supra note 43, at 552-57; see also NVF Co.,
210 N.L.R.B. 663, 663-64 (1974) (deeming meetings in the general manager's office
non-coercive because "the employees were familiar with this office" and "not called
singly . .
but in groups of five or six").
99 The additional factors include the level of manager speaking, whether that
manager has a history of union hostility, whether the employer was seeking
information from the employee, and, if so, the "lt]ruthfulness of the reply." Phillips
66 (Sweeny Refinery), 360 N.L.R.B. 124, 128 (2014); see also Miklin Enters. Inc., 361
N.L.R.B. 283, 283 n.2 (2014) (deeming individualized questioning "noncoercive"
because "the conversation took place casually, in an open area, rather than in an office
or other locus of authority; and the questioning was rhetorical"); Sunnyland Packing
Co., 227 N.L.R.B. 590, 597 (1976) (finding "meetings held with employees in the
relatively neutral area adjacent to the cafeteria" to be "basically noncoercive" and not
"in violation of section 8(a)(1)").
100 Becker, Union Representation, supra note 43, at 553. Place-familiarity can also
trump other facts that would seem to prompt serious distress, like finding yourself
alone, face-to-face with the president. See Flex Products, Inc., 280 N.L.R.B. 1117,
1117-18 (1986) (finding individualized anti-union meetings non-coercive because the
president "had on previous occasions talked to employees in the plant manager's
office").
101 See Paul M. Secunda, The Contemporary "Fist Inside the Velvet Glove": Employer
Captive Audience Meetings Under the NLRA, 5 FLA. INT'L U. L. REV. 385, 385-86 (2010)
[hereinafter Meetings Under the NLRA]. An empirical report to the 2000 U.S. Trade
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Under a classically transactional approach, this is, quite plainly,
"coercion." The gathering is itself a section 8(c) "threat," as the
explicit or implicit message underlying its convening is "attend . . . or
else," with "else" meaning termination. 102 Though few tactics provoke
advocates' ire like captive assemblies, the Board has not struggled with
the contradiction.1 03 This is attributable possibly to inertia or, more
likely, ingrained conceptions of worklife, where threats to fire if the
uniform looks wrong; or for not coming to an operations meeting; or
for not attending an anti-union meeting are all seen as equally valid
extensions of "the employee's common law duty to obey." 0 4
While the Board may be starting to probe this equivalence for the
first time, the tip-toe itself only highlights the agency's failure to
develop a coercion measuring stick. Specifically, a recent dissent
rightly stressed that what separates the disciplinary threat in a captive
meeting from every other threat is that it "is directly tied" to NLRA
choices: "[T]hey will surely remember not only that the employer
Deficit Commission found that over ninety percent of employers hold captive meetings.
Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages,
and Union Organizing, CORNELL DIGITAL COMMONs
78
tbl.8
(2000),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=reports.
102 See 2 Sisters Food Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 1816, 1825, 1828 (2011) (Becker,
Member, dissenting) ("An express or implied threat of discipline for not listening to
the employer's speech indisputably adds to the speech the element of coercion . . . .").
In fact, anyone can be fired for leaving or asking questions. See F. W. Woolworth Co.,
251 N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980) (asking questions); Litton Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B.
1024, 1030 (1968) (leaving).
103 The seminal analysis is from Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578
(1948), which contained no substantive analysis at all. From there, "one searches
Board precedent in vain for a colorable rationale for the current rule . . . ." 2 Sisters
Food Grp., 357 N.L.R.B. at 1828 (Becker, Member, dissenting); see also Paul M.
Secunda, The Future of NLRB Doctrine on Captive Audience Speeches, 87 IND. LJ. 123,
135 (2012) thereinafter Captive Audience Speeches] ("There may not be a good
explanation as to why Gissel has not yet been specifically applied to the captive
audience setting . . . .").
104 Story, supra note 15, at 421-22. As Becker has noted, "[by 1975, even a liberal
Board member declared that he had 'no quarrel with the view that the Act does not
preclude'" captive audience meetings. Becker, Union Representative, supra note 43, at
558-59 (citing J.P. Stevens & Co., 219 N.L.R.B. 850, 854 (1975) (Fanning, Member,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). A number of scholars have discussed why
the reticence to re-examine the nature of captives cannot be related to constitutional
concerns. See, e.g., Roger C. Hartley, Freedom Not to Listen: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of
Compulsory Indoctrination Through Workplace Captive Audience Meetings, 31 BERKLEYJ.
EMP. & LAB. L. 65, 69-70 (2010) ("[Tjhe First Amendment simply does not protect
coercing another into forced ideological listening."); Secunda, Meetings Under the
NLRA, supra note 101, at 404-07 (describing "a per se ban on employer captive
audience meetings" as "entirely supported by . . U.S. Supreme Court precedent").
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urged them to vote against representation but that the employer
threatened them with termination . . . if they refused to listen." 05 Put
otherwise, workers may also recall an employer's threats to listen to its
views on quality control, but a federal statute doesn't allow them to
make up their own minds about that.
This argument, however, needs another step. Pointing out that
workers remember the meeting and the threat is one thing, but being
able to show the degree to which both inform the decision-making
process - and do so in a way that is worse than, say, ordering cleanup in aisle five - would be even more persuasive. Ultimately the
dissent can't do it because the Board hasn't provided the analytical tool
to pull it off.
A consequence of this deficiency is seen in cases like Frito Lay,
where officials spent an average of thirty to thirty-six hours sitting next
to employee-truckers urging them to vote against the union as they
went about their delivery routes. 106 The majority characterized the
rides as so "relaxed," "casual," "amicable," and "non-threatening" that
the tactic was not just non-coercive, but actually consistent with
laboratory conditions.10 7 The dissent, on the other hand, contended
that by playing on the social pressure to talk when an authority figure
invades an otherwise private area like a truck's cab, the rides were
perfectly coercive, tailored to "inhibit some drivers from supporting the
union and inhibit others from engaging in open union activity that
might become a topic for a ride-along conversation."1 0 3 Which side is
right? Without a metric, it's hard to do much more than argue about it.
2.

8(b)(1)(A)

The NLRB has not figured out a way to weigh the union-initiated
"coercion" prohibited by section 8(b)(1)(A) either. The best that can
be said is that whatever was originally intended, over time the Board
and courts have come to treat the provision less expansively than its
employer counterpart.1 09 This may be an evolved consequence of
105 2 Sisters Food Grp., 357 N.L.R.B. at 1825 (Becker, Member, dissenting).
106 See Frito Lay, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 515, 515-16 (2004).
107

Id. at 517.

108 Id. at 518.
109 See, e.g., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1949, at 81 (1950),

-

https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1677/nlrbl949.pdf
("Congress did not intend that section 8(b)(1)(A) be given the broad application
accorded section 8(a)(1)."). Moreover, unlike employer violations of section 8(a)
which result in derivative violations of section 8(a)(1) - union violations of section
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Congress's decision to retain "interference" as a lower trip-wire in
section 8(a)(1).110 Perhaps that has led to a larger universe of activities
scooped up by the section as a whole, and because judges tend to
brand everything "coercion" the term has developed a certain
conceptual capaciousness in the 8(a)(1) context going forward.
But it really reflects power differentials.111 The employer signs
paychecks and has forty-hours-a-week to order workers around, so
managers have serious means and ample ability to artificially bend
wills. Unions, on the other hand, are both barred from the job and
frequently forced into geographic and temporal gymnastics to even
make contact with employees.11 2 If management wants to get a
message out, it calls a staff meeting and everybody has to show up. If a
union has an all-points-bulletin, it sends an email and hopes it doesn't
end up in the junk folder. Labor just has fewer opportunities and
options to pull-off or follow-up on confrontational conduct, and
judges notice. Thirteen years after Taft-Hartley, the Supreme Court
stated that the Board's power under the section was "limited to
authority to proceed against union tactics involving violence,
intimidation, and reprisal or threats thereof." 13 And in fact,
conventional 8(b)(1)(A) violations 14 tend to involve extreme facts
physical assaults, property damage, and threats of both are the norm

8(b) do not automatically implicate section 8(b)(1)(A). See Nat'l Mar. Union of Am., 78
N.L.R.B. 971, 982-85 (1948).
110 Jackson & Heller, supra note 70, 7-8.
"I See Louis-Allis Co. v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1972), petition denied
and cross-petition granted ("The employer occupies a far different position with regard
to the coercive impact of its actions upon employees than does a Union."); Randell
Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 591, 598 (2006) (Liebman & Walsh,
and its
Members, dissenting) ("A union has much less access to employees . .
conduct is far less likely to coerce them.").
112 See Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533 (1992). A 2011 attempt to
organize workers in Queens is representative: "On average, a worker's house would be
visited around ten times, with some requiring as many as seventeen visits, before the
union finally made contact." Benjamin Becker, Taking Aim at Target: West Indian
Immigrant Workers Confront the Difficulties of Big-Box Organizations, in NEW LABOR IN
NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT 25, 37
(Ruth Milkman & Ed Ott eds., 2014) [hereinafter Taking Aim].
113 NLRB v. Drivers, Local Union No. 639, 362 U.S. 274, 290 (1960).
114 1 say "conventional" because the provision has almost entirely morphed into a
tool for policing the propriety of internal union discipline. Today the "bulk" of section
8(b)(1)(A) cases involve not workers' organizational choices but union member fines
and representation issues. THE DEVELOPING LABOTz LAw, supra note 15, at 94-95;
Hartley, supra note 73, at 831-47(examining this shift and its sharp departure from
section 8(b)(1)(A)'s legislative intent).
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and are about nine times less common than section 8(a)(1)
misconduct.115
And yet, even this relatively bright line coercion rule has not
stopped the Board from reaching, again, for proxy-based tools to
support 8(b)(1)(A) allegations. For example, the agency has long
accepted the counter-intuitive theory that when unions coerce
employers, they legally coerce employees. This almost transitive
notion of coercion assumes that because workers associate with both
unions and employers, they internalize even second-hand knowledge
of union acts against employers "as a reliable warning of what might
befall them" just as easily. 11 6 Historically, the doctrine applied only to
union coercion of managerial activity that, if engaged in by an
employee, would be protected by section 7. The classic example would
-

be crossing a picket line.117 But more recently, the requirement of an
"unmistakable nexus" between union misconduct and protected

employee activity has vanished.11 8 That means, in practice, that
115 See, e.g., Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union 450, 267 N.L.R.B. 775,
810 (1983) (violating section 8(b)(1)(A) for a death threat and physical assault); Gen.
Teamsters, Local 298, 236 N.L.R.B. 428, 436-37 (1978) (violating section 8(b)(1)(A)
for "damaging the automobiles" and "blocking the ingress of employees attempting to
enter the plant grounds through [the Union's] picket line" and "threatening ...
employees and their families with . . . unspecified reprisals" for the same). The rough
disparity between employer- and employee-generated complaints is as reported in a
Board dissent. See Randell Warehouse, 347 N.L.R.B. at 600 ("Between 1994 and 2005,
for every complaint that the General Counsel issued against a union, he issued nine
against employers. Correspondingly, during the same period. Board decisions
involving employers as respondents exceeded decisions involving union respondents
by a rate of [nine] to [one].").
116 Cent. Mass. Joint Bd., Textile Workers Union of Am., 123 N.L.R.B. 590, 609
(1959); see 1199, Nat'1 Health & Human Serv. Emps. Union, 339 N.L.R.B. 1059, 1061
(2003) ("Union misconduct [against employers] coerces employees who witness it or
learn of it because they may reasonably conclude that if they do not support the
union's goals, like coercion will be inflicted against them.").
117 As the Board once stated:
The theory is that the violence is calculated to serve as a warning to
nonstriking employees who observe it or who reasonably may be expected to
learn of it, that like violence may be inflicted upon them if they do not
support the labor organization in the activity in which it is engaged. In
addition violence upon management officials has been held to tend to
restrain or coerce the striking employees in their right to abandon the strike if
they should become of such mind.
District 65, Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union, 133 N.L.R.B. 1555, 1566 (1961);
see also Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 219 N.L.R.B. 862, 863 (1975) (applying the
theory to a bargaining session).
n1 1199, Nat'l Health & Human Serv. Emps. Union, 339 N.L.R.B. at 1063 (Liebman,
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through . .

. at managers without any overt

motive" undoubtedly upsets the managers, labor law says the upset is
a proxy for the feelings of employees who only hear about it later. 119
How gossip about a "ludicrous scene" divorced from any trapping of
collective activity translates to coerced interests for or against unions
is difficult to figure.1 20
B.

Employer and Consumer Coercion and the Issue of Ill-Measurement

Labor law also aims for rationality when employers and the broader
public make decisions. That goal is similarly policed by anti-coercion
provisions, this time in section 8(b)(4). Again, the scheme is hobbled
both by a lack of metric for that key term and a reliance on proxies, in
this case a historical preoccupation with signs and sticks.
1.

8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and its Picketing Wake

NLRA section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) makes it illegal "to threaten, coerce, or
restrain any person" with "an object" of "forcing or requiring any
person .

.

. to cease doing business with any other person."l21 The

provision grew out of a Taft-Hartley-era attempt to restore common
law rules that saw attempts to pressure neutral parties to intervene in
labor disputes as flatly illegal.1 22 By the early-1930s federal antiinjunction legislation and softened judicial perspectives had returned

&

Member, dissenting) (citing Culinary Workers Local 226, 323 N.L.R.B. 148, 159 n.29
(1997)).
119 Id. at 1065.
120 Id. at 1064; see also id. at 1063 (Liebman, Member, dissenting) (calling it
"dubious ...
that employees would interpret" such activity "as sending them any
message at all, even indirectly").
121 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (2018). A violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii) thus
requires bad conduct (i.e., coercion or a threat of coercion), plus a bad object (i.e.,
"conduct undertaken with a design to pressure a neutral party to intercede" with a
"more direct target"). See Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB
Interpretationof Section 8(B)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA.J. LAB
EMP. L. 905, 931-36 (2005). A sister provision - section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) - operates
similarly but with different conduct: inducing or encouraging "any person" to strike.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i). The statute lists "forcing or requiring any person to
cease . . . dealing in the products of any other producer" as another possible object in
both cases, but because the "cease doing business with" language is broader it is more
commonly cited.
122 See Bock, supra note 121, at 912-13; Dan Ganin, Note, A Mock Funeral for a
FirstAmendment Double Standard: Containing Coercion in Secondary Labor Boycotts, 92
MINN. L. Rnv. 1539, 1543-44 (2008).
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the tactic to labor's arsenal,1 23 but in the Wagner Act's post-WWII
backlash the notion of embroiling unsuspecting "stranger [s]" in
another's fight seemed at least "unfair[]" and at worst too powerful. 2 4
Loophole-ridden drafting led to further amendment in 1959 and the
current "coercion" language, but by then the legislative concern was
not sensible economic play but outright bullying.1 25 In a televised
address trumpeting the revision, President Eisenhower called neutral
pressure an "oppressive . .

scheme" by "unscrupulous organization

officials" against "innocent bystanders" that "America" wants
"stopped." 26 The legislative history is also replete with tales of
individual stores confronted with a choice between union recognition
or crippling protest.1 27
For reform advocates, both scenarios fell under the "coercion"
heading,1 28 and, as with sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A), the alarm
related to overpowered wills, from a series of angles.1 29 There was
worry that consumers would decide to avoid a neutral business out of
123 Specifically, the 1932 passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)

&

&

exempting labor from anti-trust restrictions gave unions "a relatively unfettered legal
right to engage in secondary activities." Bock, supra note 121, at 910-12; see also Larry
S. Bush, Customers, Coercion and Congressional Intent: Regulating Secondary Consumer
Boycotts Under the National Labor Relations Act, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 1127, 1130-31
(1984) (describing "judicial climate change" during this period).
124 See GoRMAN & FINKIN, supra note 77, at 382; Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt
Benjamin C. Ellis, The Relative BargainingPower of Employers and Unions in the Global
Information Age: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Japan, 20 IND. INT'L
COMP. L. REv. 1, 4 (2010); see also 95 CONG. REC. 8709 (1949) ("[TIhe secondary
boycott ban is merely intended to prevent a union from injuring a third person who is
involved in any way in the dispute or strike, and therefore should not suffer economic
damage simply because of the action of a labor union." (statement of Sen. Taft)).
125 See Bock, supra note 121, at 913-15.
126 105 CONG. REC. A8488-89 (1959), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DiscLosuRE ACT OF 1959, at 1842-43 (1960)
[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
127 See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 65-68 (1964);
Int'l Hod Carriers Bldg. & Common Laborers Union of Am., Local 840, 135 N.L.R.B.
1153, 1154-55, 1157 (1962) (describing floor debate that "reveals . . . conflict and
compromise" related to so-called "blackmail" recognition pressure).
128 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 126, at 1842 ("Chief among the abuses which
Americans need protection are the oppressive practices of coercion .... ).
129 See Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudenceof Epithets, 39 VA.
L. REV. 1023, 1039 (1953) ("[Tjhere is no debate over the prevailing meaning of
'coercion' . . . the term conveys . ..

that there has been some kind of forceful

substitution of the coercer's will for that of an unsuccessfully resistant person."); see
also id. at 1040-51 (drawing distinctions between the observers and the objects of
coercive pressure).
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intimidation, not persuasion, that the neutral business would
repudiate the company at the heart of the dispute for the same
reason, 130 and that lots of businesses would accept representation, and
lots of employees would join unions, not after weighing the plusses
and minuses, but because it was required to stay operational or
employed.131

In every case the conception of coercion was almost pathologically
infused with picketing dread. Owing perhaps to its militaristic, even
weaponized linguistic origins or to years of state court depictions of
picketers as irrepressibly violent,1 32 federal judges had come to view
mode[] of
signs and sticks as a categorically "different . .
nothing to
reasons
having
for
[d]
action"
that
"induce
communication"
133 For policy-makers, pickets became
said.
what
the
placard
do with
the "archetypal" form of anti-employer, anti-consumer coercion,13 4 as
exemplified by two further clarifications in 1959 that skipped right
over the term to get to the same essential point: just don't picket. 135
130 See Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. at 65-68.
131 Senator McClellan, who headed the hearings into union practices that provided
an impetus for the 1959 amendments, described unionization as the cost of continued
existence for targeted companies: "[A] labor boss walk{s] into management's office,
slap[s] a contract on the desk and sayls], 'You sign it and put your men into this
union, or else . . . ."' LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 126, at 1175; see also id. at 1518
(describing a car dealer warned by a union official: "We realize we cannot organize
your employees, therefore you will have to organize them for us, or we'll break you").
In these situations, employees might feel compelled to join the union to keep
company running, see Bernard D. Meltzer, OrganizationalPicketing and the NLRB: Five
on a Seesaw, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 78, 80 (1962), but prior to the Taft-Hartley
amendments non-members could also be fired under so-called "closed shop"
contractual arrangements. Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech
and Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 1023, 103132 (2013) [hereinafter Political Speech].
132 See Mark D. Schneider, Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1490-91 (1982) (describing this history through case law).
133 Hughes v. Superior Court of Cal., 339 U.S. 460, 464-65 (1950). In this sense
1940's Thornhill v. Alabama 310 U.S. 88, 101-03, 106 (1940), which rejected a state
picketing ban on constitutional grounds, stands as a notable - and soon marginalized
- exception. See Int'l Bhd of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 291
(1957) (stating that Thornhill had been subject to "decisive reconsideration").
134 See Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment, On Mock Funerals, Banners, and Giant Rat
Balloons: Why Current Interpretation of Section 8(B) (4) (II) (B) of the National Labor
Relations Act Unconstitutionally Burdens Union Speech, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 1621, 1629-30
(2007); see also 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assoc., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1, 760 F.3d 708,
720 (7th Cir. 2014) ("[P]icketing ...
of a neutral entity is the paradigmatic case of
coercive secondary act'vity.").
135 A proviso to section 8(b)(4)(ii) allows for "publicity, other than picketing," to
announce to consumers that a neutral employer is distributing goods produced by a
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The perceived coercive qualities remain today,1 36 so labor law
continues to allow pickets only in limited situations, like against the
"primary" target in a labor fight or for a product boycott, but even
then with major caveats. 137
a.

The Lack of Metric

A primary consequence of the Board's fixation with picketing is its
tendency to short-hand the search for employer and consumer
coercion as the search for pickets. That is to say, instead of measuring
business at the center of a dispute. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. at 59

(describing the proviso in detail). Similarly, section 8(b)(7) makes

it

illegal "to picket

or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer"
under certain circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2018). In effect, both provisions
could have simply outlawed coercion.
136 Justice Stevens's concurrence in Safeco, which stated that labor picketing is a
"mixture of conduct of communication" where the "conduct element rather than the
particular idea being expressed" predominates, has generally provided the most stable
justification. NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 618-19
(1980); see also Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local
Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Justice Stevens' Safeco
that a majority of the Court eventually
provided the rationale ...
concurrence ...
adopted."). There are, however, "multiple" other "accounts" that can be cited as
Court-approved rationales. Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United& The
Futureof Labor Speech Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 19-20 (2011) (discussing the
long history of justifications). Through it all, the underlying idea that picketing
"bypasses viewers' faculties of reason and, thus, in a sense brainwashes," remains.
LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 200 (1985).

&

&

137 Section 8(b)(4)(B) exempts "primary picketing." But section 8(b)(7) then bars
primary picketing with a recognitional or organizational "object" if the employer is
already unionized, if there has been an election in the past twelve months, or if it
continues for over thirty days without a representation petition. See 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(7)(A)-(C). A section 8(b)(7)(C) proviso, however, allows pickets that tell the
public "that the employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with" the
union (so long as deliveries continue), id. §158(b)(7)(C), and the Board and courts
have long agreed that picketing in response to unfair labor practices or to shame a
business for not paying an "area standard" wage is not for a recognitional or
organization object and can continue for more than thirty days. See, e.g., Waiters
Bartenders Local 500, 140 N.L.R.B. 433, 437 (1963) (picketing to protest unfair labor
practices); S.F. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 794, 799
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (picketing for area standards); Houston Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 136 N.L.R.B. 321, 323-24 (1962) (picketing for area standards). Further,
pickets that tell consumers to avoid a "struck" product are lawful under Fruit
Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. at 63-69, 71-73, but only if the message does not threaten
an entity selling the product with "ruin or substantial loss." Retail Store, 477 U.S. at
623-24. See generally Bock, supra note 121, at 918-35 (describing picketing rights and
restrictions under section 8(b)(4)); Lee Modjeska, Recognitional Picketing Under the
NLRA, 35 U. FL. L. REV. 633 (1983) (discussing the impact on picketing imposed by
section 8(b)(7)).

1616

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 52:1585

the coerciveness of a protest directly, analysis often centers on where
conduct falls along a continuum from picketing (coercive), to "the
functional equivalent of picketing" (also coercive),1 38 to hand-billing,
which the Supreme Court has definitively blessed as "mere
persuasion."1 39 But as was true in the employee context, the proxy
approach fails to be a satisfactory test for coercion's presence or
impact.
A major issue is that the definition of "picketing" itself has been
amazingly immune to standardization, so it is hard to detect.
Patrolling or walking around with a sign has been said to be the "core"
element, but the Board has also called standing still at an entrance the
"essential feature."140 A "physical or, at least, a symbolic confrontation
between picketers" and passers-by has also been called "central,"141
but the D.C. Circuit recently said picketing doesn't even require
people, that a sign in a car or a snowbank will do.142 Things get
messier in the context of some modern protest campaigns. There,
conduct can extend to capers like following someone around a comics
store or a roving Grim Reaper,1 43 forcing judges to label what is
essentially guerilla theater as either sort of like picketing or a bit more
like flyering.1 44 Sometimes the protest is so far removed from either
that a credible comparison cannot be made - a few protestors toss
garbage bags or many more than a few shop en masse - and coercion
138 Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 437-38 (D.C.
Cir. 2007).
139 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 578, 580 (1988); see also 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assoc., Ltd., 760 F.3d at 720
("[Plicketing is at one end of a spectrum - the prohibited end - with handbilling on
the other, permissible end.").
140 Compare In re United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local Union No
1506, 355 N.L.R.B. 797, 802 (2010) (stating that "patrolling back and forth" is "core"
to picketing's "meaning" and listing cases), with Serv. Emps. Union, Local 87, 312
N.L.R.B. 715, 743 (1993) ("[N]either patrolling alone nor patrolling combined

with .

.

. placards are essential elements .

.

. rather, the 'important' or essential feature

.

of picketing is the posting of individuals at entrances . .
141 United Bhd., 355 N.L.R.B at 802.
142 Verizon New England Inc. v. NLRB, 826 F.3d 480, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
143 See 520 S. Mich. Ave., 760 F.3d at 732; Sheet Metal Workers', 491 F.3d at 432-33.
144 See, e.g., 520 5. Mich. Ave., 760 F.3d at 720 (calling "the central question in this
case . . . whether the Union's conduct . . is coercive, as in the sense of a . . . picket, or
persuasive, as in the case of handbilling" where the "conduct alleged ... is not
satisfactorily described as either"); Sheet Metal Workers', 491 F.3d at 438 ("Having
determined the mock funeral lies somewhere between . . . lawful handbilling . .. and
unlawful picketing . . . we reach the ultimate question whether the . . . message was

coercive . . . .").
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then turns on "disruption." 4 5 In the end, most section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
decisions read like analytic free-styling,1 46 with the predictable result
that judges frequently disagree over identical facts.' 47
The bigger tell, however, is the critical fact that a map from
picketing-to-handbilling doesn't lead the way to irrational decisionmaking. As others have covered, the classic justifications for
from the
range
coercive character
picketing's purportedly
anachronistic to the unpersuasive. That modern picketing is not
inescapably violent should, at this point, be self-evident.14 8 Drained of
that subtext, the associated assumption that even non-violent labor
picketing is so threatening that some people will reflexively "turn
away" is undercut,1 49 as it is by the observed reality that people are not
145 See United Bhd., 355 N.L.R.B. at 805 (stating that "nonpicketing conduct" is
"coercive only when" it causes "disruption of the secondary's operations"); Serv.

Emps. Int'l Union, Local 525, 329 N.L.R.B. 638, 664-65, 680 (1999) (throwing trash
bags); see also Pye v. Teamsters Local Union No. 122, 61 F.3d 1013, 1024 (1st Cir.
1995) (discussing "group shopping" as a "new twist" defying "traditional
conception[s]" of protest).
146 As James Gray Pope has emphasized, determining what conduct is "effectively"
picketing is an extremely difficult task, because the "concept of effect ... is infinitely
expandable." See James Gray Pope, Labor Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old
Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REv. 889, 939-40
(1991) (listing examples). It is no surprise that student casebooks have a field-day
with the exercise. See, e.g., KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT ET AL., LABOR LAW IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE

832 (2d ed. 2014) (listing activities ranging from singing

folksongs to snowmen carrying signs and asking students to "identify what is
'coercive' within the meaning of [section] 8(b)(4)").
'4
Compare Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15, 418 F.3d 1259,
the [mock funeral] . . . [was] the
1265 (11th Cir. 2005) ("We readily conclude ...
functional equivalent of picketing."), and Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15,
346 N.L.R.B. 199, 199-200 (2006) (concluding that a mock funeral "constituted
picketing"), with Sheet Metal Workers', 491 F.3d at 439 ("[Wle disagree with the
Board that the [mock funeral] was 'picketing."').
148 In other activism contexts, even aggressive pickets that block public access and
distress those nearby do not necessarily lead to violence. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps,
562 U.S. 443, 447-49 (2011) (picketing military funerals); Madsen v. Women's Health
Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 757-62 (1994) (picketing abortion clinics). An attempt to
uncover recent examples of labor picketing that descended into violence would either
come up empty or reveal a genuine outlier. See, e.g., Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Are You
Following Me Now? Striking Verizon Workers Keep Tabs on Their Replacements, WALL
(Apr. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/are-you-following-me-nowST. J.
(describing
striking-verizon-workers-keep-tabs-on-their-replacements-1461336301
sustained and perhaps annoying or even aggressive mobile picketing that nevertheless
remained peaceful); see also Pope, supra note 146, at 905 n.83 (noting only two
instances of publicly-reported "violence in labor-related consumer boycotts between
1980 and 1990").
149 See Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775
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all that intimidated by signs on sticks.150 And on that point, without
some kind of empirical support it is hardly obvious why signs
observed from afar are overpowering but in-person interactions with
activists whose cause depends upon a "two-stage process" of pausing
and reading is purely enlightening. 151
A final basis for picketing's categorization is that it "signal[s]" to
union members that blind obedience is required, regardless of the
underlying dispute.15 2 If there was once merit to this idea it was prior
to Taft-Hartley, when getting expelled from the union for defying a
picket risked ejection from the job or, even, any unionized job.15 3 But
that is old law. 154 Modern "signal" enforcement is limited to social
sanctions, viewed by contemporary commentators as "notoriously
weak." 155 But even if not, the prospect of ostracism or hard feelings is
precisely the sort of thing someone might deliberate about. 156 Peer
(1942).
150 Years ago, Theodore St. Antoine made the point that absent facts involving "a
frail, elderly person" and "six brawny fellows looking like extras out of On the
Waterfront," very little about labor picketing is objectively threatening. See Theodore
J. St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The PersistingProblem of Picketing, 16
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 883, 883 (1982). If the truth were otherwise, we might expect
product or even primary picketing to be an over-powering activist tactic. They are not.
See, e.g., JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER Do 89-90 (2014) (describing the

drastic decline of primary strikes); Pope, supra note 146, at 906-08 ("[SItatistical
studies support the view that consumer boycotts rarely . .. can be said to coerce target
acquiescence."). Moreover, as I have detailed elsewhere, the notion that union
members have the capacity to exact unique forms of intimidation on the public
misapprehends their place in the modem American mindset. See Michael M. Oswalt,
Automatic Elections, 4 UC IRVINE L. REV. 801, 818-23 (2014) (describing the causes
and consequences of diminished union consciousness in contemporary times).
151 Pope, supra note 146, at 938. Justice Stevens opined that handbills "are so much
less effective than labor picketing" because they "depend entirely on the persuasive
force of the idea." NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619
(1980). Theodore St. Antoine has wondered in response, "Cannot the handbiller
confront the approaching customer with the same pair of beady eyes as the picketer?"
Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Law in Two TransitionalDecades, 42
BRANDEIs L.J. 495, 501 (2004); cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464,
464 n.23 (1978) (acknowledging "abuses inherent" in "face-to-face selling even of
ordinary consumer products" and the associated need for regulation).
152 See Retail Store, 447 U.S. at 619.
153 See Fisk & Chemerinsky, Political Speech, supra note 131, at 1031-32.
154 Id. While unions may still revoke membership for strikebreaking, NLRB v. AllisChalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181-82 (1967), the loss of status is no longer a lawful
basis for discharge. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, Political Speech, supra note 131, at 1032.
155 Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice, supra note 24, at 692 n.155.
156 As Catherine Fisk and Jessica Rutter have suggested, even if signs trigger
reflexive loyalty to a cause or reluctance to be condemned by those underneath, the
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pressure is also, of course, a defining feature of solidarity.1 57 Without

it, labor law's premise falls apart. 58 So if today the aggregate responses
to picketing cause a business to suffer, it's not because the pickets are
too coercive, it's because the pickets are too persuasive.
Ill.

RETHINKING LABOR LAw DECISION-MAKING

To summarize so far: labor law is about decision-making, the Board
desires that the choices be made rationally, so, guided by the statute, it
restricts interventions that implicate "coercion." The integrity of the
doctrinal edifice thus rests on labor law's ability to identify coercion
and fix it. As noted, criticism of the agency's take on coercion is not
new, but I have tried to redirect concern to the foundational problem:
the absence of a workable method to conceptualize and measure it. I
suggest that this void affects every angle of analysis, from employees,
to employers, to consumers.
The remainder of the Article veers into what is, at least for labor law,
uncharted territory. At this point, the literature teems with discussions
about what does or does not coerce and sometimes why, but little has
been said about what coercion "is," exactly. That is, coercion's

&

onlooker has still been moved by a message, not robotized. See Catherine Fisk

&

Jessica Rutter, Labor Protest Under the New First Amendment, 36 BERKELEY J. EMP.
LAB. L., 277, 318 ("The power of the message and the social sanctions a community
may impose for flouting norms do not make a message less communicative."); see also
In re United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 355
N.L.R.B. 797, 806 (2010) (seeking "to invoke 'cc-victions or emotions sympathetic to
the union activity"' is "persuasion, not coercion").
157 Strike settings provide the clearest example of the law's respect for this
principle. See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 283 (1974) ("[Flederal law gives a union license to use
intemperate, abusive, or insulting language without fear of restraint or penalty if it
believes such rhetoric to be an effective means to make its point."). Researchers and
advocates also underscore peer pressure's centrality to collective action. See, e.g.,
Daniel G. Gallagher & George Strauss, Union Membership Attitudes and Participation,
in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 139, 168-69 (George Strauss et al. eds., 1991) (linking
mobilization potentials to collective commitments and "peer pressures"); Charley
Richardson, Working Alone: The Erosion of Solidarity in Today's Workplace, 17 NEW
LAB. F. 69, 71 (2008) (describing the importance of "peer pressure" in "creating and
enforcing" solidarity "norms through both positive and negative reinforcement").
158 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (declaring the "policy of the United States" to
encourage "the practice and procedure of collective bargaining" and "selforganization"); Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181 ("Integral to this federal labor policy
has been the power in the chosen union to protect against erosion [of] its
status . . . ."); Fresh & Easy Neighborhood Mkt., Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 151, 155 (2014)
("In enacting Section 7, Congress created a framework for employees to 'band
together' in solidarity . . . .").
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substance - how it operates, what it's made of, how its workings
should be conceived - is somewhat of a black box. Judges may know
it when they see it, but if pressed might have trouble describing its
nuts-and-bolts in isolation. So, in the second half of the Article, I seek
to give NLRA coercion content for the first time.
The task begins with acknowledgement that today few decisional
specialists would casually accept the law's baseline that if someone
picked "x" instead of "y," well, that's just how the math worked out.
That would come as no surprise to anyone familiar with recent
bestseller lists, where a slew of titles steeped in behavioral economics
have shown not simply that people's choices are not, in the main,
rational, but that decision-making is "predictably irrational," with a
variety of heuristics, biases, intuitions, and defaults warping objective
processing nearly all the time.' 59 That is a conclusion echoed in
another expanding field, law and neuroscience, which uses technology
to try and locate decision mechanisms in various parts of the brain. 160
Either perspective might be used to deepen the law's understanding
of coercion. So-called "neurolaw's" whole point, for instance, is that
choice distortions can be measured and even seen on a screen.161 My
inquiry, however, draws from an area that is related to the other two
yet also a traditionally less welcome guest at the law academic party.1 62
Over just the last few decades researchers have begun to probe how
judgments interact with emotions, and the resulting "law and
159

See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR

&

53, 317-18 (2009); see also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST
SLOw 8-15 (2011) (giving common examples of biased decision-making); MICHAEL
DECISIONS xviii-xxi,

LEWIS, THE UNDOING PROJECT 18-19 (2017) (tracing the rise of behavioral economics);
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3-8 (2008) (discussing how environmental cues or nudges

shape behaviors); Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. STATE U. L.
REV. 107, 108-11 (2010) (describing culturally-based biases and implications for labor
and employment analysis).
160 See Abrams & Keren, supra note 11, at 2021-27.
161

See id. at 2025.

Abrams and Keren call behavioral law and economics, law and neuroscience,
and law and emotions "branches of the same tree" that academics have approached
with differing levels of acceptance. Id. at 1999, 2020. Some even seem to merge the
three, putting emotions at the root of behavioral insights. See, e.g., Tamsin Shaw,
Invisible Manipulators of Your Mind, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/04/20/kahneman-tversky-invisible-mindmanipulators/ ("[E]motions powerfully influence our intuitive analysis of probability
and risk."). Abrams and Keren concede this link but emphasize that "behavioral law
and economics . .. does not analyze responses that we would describe as emotions,
but focuses rather on nonaffective cognitive assumptions that depart from rationality."
Abrams & Keren, supra note 11, at 2020.
162
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emotions" scholarship has emerged as perhaps the most direct
"collective corrective" to rationalism's centrality in legal thought and
decision-making.1 63 As Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren have
recounted, the path has proceeded in fits and starts, first with
grudging acceptance of the initially "radical" claim that, like it or not,
emotions already saturate the choices made by judges, academics, and
teachers,1 64 and later through studies of specific emotions, sparking
debate about, for example, the propriety of "disgust" in law.1 65
Yet for all its progress, by 2010, law and emotions still struggled to
defy perceptions that the field was "more of a novelty than a pragmatic
innovation." 66 Abrams and Keren rose to counter that view, arguing
that, far from an "academic pastime," emotions are a key "instrument"
for solving "pressing legal problems." 67 They urged law and emotion
scholars to answer critics by proving the "pragmatic value of law and
emotions work" through fresh examinations of doctrinal conundrums
and proposals for "specific normative legal solutions" based on
research-based, affective principles.1 68
Here, I take up Abrams's and Keren's challenge. If anything, the case
is more compelling today. Writing in the 2015 Annual Review of
Psychology, Jennifer Lerner put emotion science at the center of a
"veritable revolution" poised to upend much of what is known about
decision-making.1 69 Reviewing the scholarship - the lion's share
163 West, supra note 39, at 340. Abrams and Keren attribute greater "mainstream"
acceptance of behavioral and neuroscience law in part to their "conceptual proximity"
to rationalist baselines. Abrams & Keren, supra note 11, at 2020. For example, even as
law and behaviorism "loosens the descriptive assumptions" of rationalism, "it retains
the centrality of that frame by cataloguing these forms of behavior as 'biases' (or
departures from rationality) . . . which reinforces rationality as the norm." Id. at 2020;
see also id. at 2026 ("[Tihe more potent association of law and neuroscience with
rationalist and objectivist norms accords it higher acceptability among legal
scholars.").
164 See id. at 2003-08 ("These insights produced a modest, yet important, shift . .
[ylet, this change in perception remained, in many ways, shallow .... Most
[academics] remained committed to a core of detached, impersonal [decisionmaking], though they acknowledged that it could be tinged at times with infusions of
affect.").
165 Id. at 2009 n.47. In this context, Abrams and Keren emphasize the impact of
Susan Bandes' edited work, THE PASSIONS OF LAw 2 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); see id.
at 2008-11. For a somewhat updated history from a different vantage, see Kathryn
Abrams, Seeking Emotional Ends with Legal Means, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1657, 1659-65
(2015).
166 Abrams & Keren, supra note 11, at 2013.
167 Id. at 1998, 2000.
168 Id. at 2002.
169 Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Emotion and Decision Making, 66 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
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published post-2004 - Lerner concluded that "scientists now assume
that emotions are, for better or worse, the dominant driver of most
meaningful decisions in life."17o

-

Thus, in considering coercion's content, emotion science is a
tantalizing resource. It doesn't have to be revolutionary, however. At
its best, a law and emotion perspective can enrich regulatory systems
by contextualizing someone's choice "not simply as a departure from
rationality, but as an affirmative mode of apprehension and response"
that can eventually be incorporated into even long-entrenched legal
assumptions.' 7 ' So while the field - and, to be sure, this Article
aims for doctrinal revision, the mechanism is less regime change and
more the offering up of a new "rubric, language, or organizing frame"
for how the law might come to understand and respond to choice in
various workplace settings.1 72 Ultimately, that is my goal.
A.

Decision-Makingand Emotions

For all the recent interest in emotions, scholars have yet to agree on
how, exactly, to define them. 73 A 2010 survey of researchers resulted
in thirty-four variations and a seventy-one-word "synthesis" that the

799, 799-800 (2015) (identifying "the potential to create a paradigm shift in decision
theories").
170 Id. at 800-01 ("[Y]early scholarly papers on emotion and decision making
doubled from 2004 to 2007 and again from 2007 to 2011, and increased by an order of
magnitude as a proportion of all scholarly publications on 'decision-making' (already a
quickly growing field) from 2001 to 2013.").
171 Abrams & Keren, supra note 11, at 1999-2000 (emphasizing that law and
emotions "does not aim simply to correct legal subjects' [decision-making] in favor of
rationality the primary normative impetus in behavioral law and economics
scholarship - but to modify legal doctrine to acknowledge and encompass affective
response. . . ").
172 Id. at 2032. Law and public health scholars, for instance, have criticized courts
involved in tobacco litigation for their "unwillingness to recognize that an 'emotional'
graphic warning label could nevertheless be 'factual."' Ellen Peters et al., Emotion in
the Law and the Lab: The Case of Graphic CigaretteWarnings, 2 TOBACCO REG. Sci. 404,
407, 409 (2016).
173 E.g., Roddy Cowie et al., Emotion: Concepts and Definitions, in EMOTIONORIENTED SYSTEMS 9, 28 (Paolo Petta et al. eds., 2011) ("[Nlobody has yet identified a
single, unifying kernel [alround which all that is known about emotion can be
organi[zled in a completely coherent, satisfying way."); Carroll E. Izard, Emotion
Theory and Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions, and Emerging Issues, 60 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (2009) [hereinafter Emotion Theory] ("None of the many efforts to
make a widely acceptable definition of emotion has proved successful.").
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author called a "noteworthy and highly pluralistic description" but
not, strictly, "a definition."174

This gap, though, has proven to be more of an academic point than
a road-block, as it has not prevented consensus in many areas relevant
to decision-making. For example, there is acceptance that discrete
emotions exist, that they have "components and characteristics" that
can be examined, and, most importantly, that they affect choice in
specific ways.1 75 In other words, if researchers have not settled on
what an emotion is, they do have a sense of what an emotion does.1 76
And in general, what emotions do is direct thought and motivate
action. On the thought side, once present, an emotion becomes an
"implicit perceptual lens" that shapes how one sees the
environment.1 77 Scientists call this an "appraisal tendency," because
studies show that each emotion has a different prism that guides
interpretations of immediate events and the future.1 78 So, a crushing

&

174 Carroll E. Izard, The Many Meanings/Aspects of Emotion: Definitions, Functions,
Activation, and Regulation, 2 EMOTION REV. 363, 367 (2010) [hereinafter The Many
Meanings]. While some have even concluded that "emotion concepts cannot be
defined at all," Anna Wierzbicka, Defining Emotion Concepts, 16 COGNITIVE Sci. 539,
540 (1992), Izard's work identifies some unifying themes suggesting basic agreement
that emotions are biologically-based "response systems" or "feeling state[s]" that
"motivate[] and organize[] cognition and action." Izard, The Many Meanings, supra, at
367. Definitions also sometimes note that emotions respond to stimuli or ."objects,
reflecting an underlying appraisal of a particular kind of situation." Gerald L. Clore
Jeffrey R. Huntsinger, How Emotions Inform Judgment and Regulate Thought, 11 TRENDS
COGNITIVE Sci. 393, 393 (2007).
175 Izard, Emotion Theory, supra note 173, at 7; see also Lerner et al., supra note
169, at 802-04 (listing themes in current emotion research that "reveal rapid progress
in mapping the psychology of emotion and decision making").
176 Julie Beck, Hard Feelings: Science's Struggle to Define Emotions, ATLANTIC (Feb.
24, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/02/hard-feelings-sciencesstruggle-to-define-emotions/385711/ ("[SIcientists agree[] more on what emotion does
than what it is.").
177 Lerner et al., supra note 169, at 805.
178 See Paul M. Litvak et al., Fuel in the Fire: How Anger Impacts Judgment and
Decision-Making, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ANGER 287, 289-290 (Michael
Potegal et al. eds., 2010). The "[alppraisal theory" is now "the dominant approach in
emotion research." Marcel Zeelenberg et al., On Emotion Specificity in Decision Making:
Why Feeling is for Doing, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 18, 20 (2008). See generally
Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of EmotionSpecific Influences on Judgement and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 473 (2000)
(proposing and justifying the framework). The model suggests that there are multiple
dimensions associated with emotion-based appraisal patterns (e.g., high or low
assessments of control, responsibility, or pleasantness), Craig A. Smith & Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotion, 48 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 813, 813 (1985), and each emotion is also thought to be "defined by [the]
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World Cup defeat does not just spark a national case of the blues, it
correlates with country-specific stock sell-offs.17 9 A parking ticket,
similarly, leads not only to anger, it drives confidence that an injustice
has been committed (no fact-finding needed); assurances about who is
responsible (an incompetent street sign-writer); and a steely resolve to
80 That the meter may have simply
fight it on appeal (with pictures).o
run out of time may be hard to spot until the underlying feeling
subsides.
Emotions also come with "action tendencies" or "impulses" that
push people to react to things with certain patterns of behavior.1 81 As
one scholar puts it, "feeling-is-for-doing."1 82 Some have argued these
are "time-tested responses to universal experiences" like a surprise or
a loss, and often the associated conduct does seem to flow
spontaneously, without much conscious thought.1 83 The classic
example is anger, which is associated with snap aggression, including
"changes to peripheral physiology that might prepare one to fight,
such as increasing blood flow to the hands." 84 Along the same lines,
central dimensions that characterize its core meaning or theme, for example, anger
being defined by a sense of certainty and individual control along with otherresponsibility." Litvak et al., supra, at 289.
179 Vivian Giang, The Myth of Rational Decision-Making, FAST COMPANY (July 6,
2015), http://www.fastcompany.com/3047924/the-future-of-work/the-myth-of-rationaldecision-making.
180 See Ellen Peters et al., Affect and Decision Making: A "Hot" Topic, 19 J. BEHAV.
DECISION-MAKING 79, 81 (2006) ("[The] Appraisal-Tendency Framework (ATF)
suggests that ... anger[] is associated with cognitive appraisals (e.g., someone else
being responsible for the event causing the emotion, a sense of certainty about what
happened, and a sense of ability to control the situation)."); see also Dacher Keltner et
al., Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social Perception, 64 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 740, 741, 751 (1993) (noting that anger, associated with
a lens of personal control, pushes a sense that individuals bear responsibility for their
own plights, while sadness, linked to situational control, spurs people to attribute the
same problems impersonally or to outside circumstances).
181 Zeelenberg, supra note 178, at 20.
182 Id.
183 Lerner,

supra note 169, at 805, 808; see also Zeelenberg, supra note 178, at 20
("[Elmotions are, at least partly, 'cognitively impenetrable': One cannot simply choose
to have or not have emotions, given certain events or outcomes that are relevant for
one's concerns.").
184 Lerner, supra note 169, at 808 (stating also that anger is linked to goals of
changing the underlying "situation and mov[ing] against another person or obstacle
by fighting, harming, or conquering it"); see also Nico H. Frijda et al., Relations Among
Emotion, Appraisal, and Emotional Action Readiness, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
212, 220 (1989) (finding that "[a]ngry emotions differ from all others ...
[with]
antagonistic tendencies such as assault or opposition . .").
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shame is said to spark "pro-social behavior," guilt, a "tendency to
cooperate." 185
B.

Emotions, Organizing, and Decisional Indecision at the NLRB

Together, the appraisal and action tendencies create a reality where
emotions "powerfully, predictably, and pervasively influence decisionmaking." 186 On the ground, everyone knows this. Unionization is
about persuasion from all sides, and persuasion is often about
emotion. 187 Gone are the days when a union organizer might rely on
88
promoting the bread-and-butter benefits of a union contract.s
Modern campaigners rely deeply on "powerful emotional appeals,"
calls for justice, and staged public dramas to arouse worker and public
sympathy.1 89 Employer maneuvers are similarly emotive, with
dramatic videos of union-prompted strife, hyper-personalized pleas by
upper-management, and cartoon propaganda as standard practice. 190
These are tactics tailored not necessarily to intuitions and biases but
explicitly to passions.

185 Zeelenberg, supranote 178, at 23.
186 Lerner et al., supranote 169, at 802.

187 See, e.g., David DeSteno et al., Discrete Emotions and Persuasion: The Role of
Emotion-Induced Expectancies, 86 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 43, 43 (2004)
("Appeal to the emotions as sources of leverage in persuasion is a venerable strategy

and one that continues to be used by politicians and marketers alike.").
188 See Rogers, supra note 40, at 348-49. A representative example includes UNITEHERE's campaign to organize L.A. Airport-adjacent hotels, which partnered with a
Catholic Church to reenact Mary's and Joseph's search for lodging with an altered
script highlighting hotel workers' struggles to survive on minimum wage. See Forrest
Stuart, From the Shop to the Streets: Unite Here Organizing in Los Angeles Hotels, in
WORKING FOR JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF ORGANIZING AND ADVOCACY 191, 197-99
(Ruth Milkman et al. eds., 2010).
189 Rogers, supranote 40, at 318, 354-55.
190 The films "And Women Must Weep" and "The Springfield Gun," which depict
a child shot by a striker, were repeat players in Board decisions throughout the 1970s
and 1980s. See, e.g., McGraw-Edison Co., 216 N.L.R.B. 460, 472-73 (1975). Today
employees are just as likely to encounter fictionalized portrayals of suffocating union
work rules, like Target's highly publicized new employee orientation film. See
Hamilton Nolan, Behold, Target's Brand New Cheesy Anti-Union Video, GAWKER (Mar.
19, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://gawker.com/behold-targets-brand-new-cheesy-anti-unionvideo-1547193676. CEOs frequently personify the electoral process with statements
like, "a vote for the union is a vote against me," see, e.g., Structural Finishing, Inc.,
284 N.L.R.B. 981, 990 (1987); Mechanical Specialties Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 154, 157
(1967); see also Story, supra note 15, at 427 (noting the prominence of cartoon
propaganda).
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The Board is itself cognizant of these realities, 191 but the resulting
doctrine evinces a sense that the agency is not quite sure how to
legally square emotions, reason, and choice. Its instinct is to provide a
legal buffer for emotive flare-ups on the job and during protests, but
the safe harbors it creates are tainted by blurry tests and labyrinthine
factors that imply an underlying ambivalence and assure hedged
holdings.1 92 In Peerless Plywood, the Board apparently intuited that
captive audience meetings provoke some sort of emotion inimical to
rationality, which it identified as a "mass psychology."1 93 Yet, in the
same breath it fled from this rationale to announce the sole limitation
applicable today - a twenty-four-hour pre-balloting bar - on the
theory that "the real vice" is "obtain[ing] the last most telling
word." 194 Sixty-some years later, the acknowledged mental element in
captive meetings, its impact on choice, and why a thirty-six, fortyeight, or even fifty-six hour cooling-off period would not have been
psychically better has never been explained. Likewise, Gissel's axiom,
that speech should be analyzed through its impact on economically
dependent ears, calls out for consideration of emotional reactions and
sensitivities.1 95 But, again, the type of reaction judges should look for,
or even the clues that might prove speech has touched an economic
191 See Archer Laundry Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1427, 1433 (1965) ("A union election is
often an emotional proceeding. Campaign literature usually appeals to some type of
emotion.").
192 The Board is clear that "protections of [s]ection 7 would be meaningless were
we not to take into account . . . the fact that [workplace] disputes . . . are among the
disputes most likely to engender ill feelings and strong responses." Hitachi Capital
Am. Corp., 361 N.L.R.B. 123, 141 (2014). And at times case law reveals special
respect for "impulsive behavior," CavalierDivision of Seeburg Corp. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d
868, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1973); "moment[s] of animal exuberance," Bettcher Mfg. Corp.,
76 N.L.R.B. 526, 527 (1948); and "provoked" spontaneity, Susan D. Carle, Angry
Employees: Revisiting Insubordinationin Title VII Cases, 10 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 185,
221-22 (2016). The broader view, however, reveals doctrinal inconsistency and
judicial and scholarly perplexity. See Consol. Commc'n Inc. v. NLRB, 837 F.3d 1, 2024 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Millett, J., concurring) (criticizing racial- and gender-based
inconsistencies in the Board's treatment of angry statements on strike-lines); Christine
Neylon O'Brien, I Swear! From Shoptalk to Social Media: The Top Ten National Labor
Relations Board Profanity Cases, 90 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 53, 105-08 (2016) (detailing the
four-factor, totality, and sub-rule analyses applied in cases of sudden workplace
outbursts); Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CAL. L. REv. 597, 662
(2016) (describing the Board's "Frankenstein-esque" test for determining if repeated
strikes are sufficiently spontaneous to receive protection).
193 Peerless
Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953) (describing "an
unwholesome and unsettling effect" impacting "sober and thoughtful choice").
194 Id.
195 See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969).
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nerve are unknown, so courts typically mouth the rule "in mantra-like
fashion" before moving onto the coercion proxies cited in
precedent. 196 And in one of the most potentially inflammatory settings
racially-tinged election appeals the Board concedes that
emotions may swirl in reason-corrupting ways but then applies a
standard roundly criticized for vagueness, incoherence, and, from civil
rights scholars, real world detachment.1 97
The Board, to be fair, is trying its best. A reliance on proxies so
disparate as to encompass both hand-signs and living rooms has surely
made establishing something like a unified theory of coercion difficult.
That labor law has proven mostly immune to legislative change makes
it unlike other relevant areas, such as human trafficking, where the
courts and congress have engaged in a back-and-forth that, while not
without fault, has gradually "capture[d] the sociological complexity"
of coercion in ways early understandings did not.1 98 And since
emotion research has matured only in the past decade or so, it is not
surprising that long-settled conceptions of decision-making have yet
to catch up. But that's all the more reason for a restart. I take on that
task in the final Part.
COERCION AS FEAR AND REGULATION BY CONTROL

IV.

The remainder of the Article proceeds in three phases. First, I
suggest that there are good reasons to depart from coercion's
conventional theoretical mode and define it instead with an emotion.
Second, I argue that emotion should be fear. Third, I propose that
labor law regulate - and measure - coercive fear through the
psychological construct of "control," and I detail how the Board could
do it.
A.

The Casefor an Emotional Model of Coercion

As noted briefly at the start, coercion's standard legal construction is
transactional. It assumes the existence of an offer (e.g., "if you do that,
this will happen") and asks whether the proposal "alters the recipient's
baseline for choice." 199 If so, and if it "leaves the recipient in a worse
196 Story, supra note 15, at 430.
197 Marion Crain, Whitewashed Labor Law, Skinwalking Unions, 23 BERKELEYJ. EMP.
& LAB. L. 211, 233, 241-45 (2002).
198 Kim, supra note 61, at 414.
199 Kuo & Means, supra note 62, at 1606. The classic account at this stage is
somewhat narrower and inquires if the recipient "has no reasonable alternative but to"
comply with the offer. WERTHEIMER, supra note 62, at 172; see also Kim, supra note 61,
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position" than before the offer was made - especially, under a
popular conception, if the offeror did not have a legal right to make
the proposal - it's coercive. 200 So, the proposition, "your money or
your life," presents two bad options and obviously deteriorates the
recipient's position, but so does, "do what I say, or else," where "else"
is ominous. 20 1 Both are coercive. Pitches that seem to provide an
opportunity or that do not affect a choice baseline, in contrast, are
not.202 For this reason, "walk my dog for $10" or "feel free to add

more salt" are usually non-coercive offers.
Much of labor law's policing of coercion, even accounting for the
Board's tendency to reach for analytic proxies, fits this mold
theoretically. 203 Whether bluntly stated or implied based on place or
past illegal conduct, conveying the message, "Vote no or get laid off,"
radically shatters an employee's choice baseline and is considered the
archetypal case of section 8(a)(1) coercion. 204 The same would be true
for "Sign the card or get roughed up" in a section 8(b)(1)(A) context.
And section 8(b)(4) similarly presumes that an offer to a neutral like,
"Stop doing business with Big Box Inc. or we'll picket," scrambles
deliberative foundations improperly and is coercive because of it.
Thus, an emotional conception of coercion may at first seem like a
substantial departure. Feelings are more relational than transactional.
The background science shows that emotions can be unconscious,
incipient, vary in degree, and suddenly arise from a look, a situation,
or a setting. 205 They cannot, in other words, necessarily be parsed into
a back-and-forth.
at 429 (depicting the "no reasonable alternative framework" as an "an unreasonable
choice set" where one is required to pick the "the lesser of two evils").
200 Kuo & Means, supra note 62, at 1606; WERTHEIMER, supra note 62, at 30.
201 Kuo & Means, supra note 62, at 1605-06.
202 See id. at 1606 ("[W]hether or not the offer is accepted, what is important is
that [in a non-coercive setting] the recipient of the offer will be left no worse off than
before.").
203 A threat, of course, is classic coercion. Id. at 1605 ("[Tlhe issue of coercion
turns on the existence of a threat.").
204 Caron Int'l Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 1120, 1121 (1979) ("A threat to discharge . .
is
'coercion of a most serious nature' . . . [and] 'one of the most flagrant means . .. to

dissuade employees from selecting a bargaining representative."' (citing Sol Henkind,
236 N.L.R.B. 683, 686 (1978); Gen. Stencils Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 1109, 1109 (1972))).
205 See Piotr Winkielman et al., Affective Influence on Judgments and Decisions:
Moving Towards Core Mechanisms, 11 REv. GEN. PSYCHOL. 179, 187 (2007) (describing
how emotion primes that impact behavior are not necessarily "accompanied by
conscious changes in mood"); see also Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Silenced by Fear:
The Nature, Sources, and Consequences of Fear at Work, 29 REs. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
163, 185 (2009) (describing "humans' innate tendency to avoid the unpleasant
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Of course, work is relational. And because it is relational, an emotive
model gets at coercive dynamics in ways the existing doctrine - and
its offer-recipient infrastructure - never has. Gissel's conclusion that
even the direst predictions are, if supported objectively, rationalityenhancing is not, on its face, unreasonable. If unionization guarantees
bankruptcy, workers -

the decision-makers -

need to know that.

But unions hate the rule not because they want to limit accurate data
they dislike, they hate it because the voters in the room have a history
with the guy in human resources who made the power-point and trust
his "well, it's out of our control" conclusion not the slightest. The
experience is harrowing, not enriching. Gissel also grants immunity to
"opinions." Yet, again, if everybody knows the ultracompetitive GM is
apoplectic for three days if he loses a round of golf, his anti-union
musings will not really feel like musings. Even constitutional scholars
have questioned how Gissel's proscription
of "conscious
overstatements" about what a unionized future might look like can be
aligned with a transactional model of coercion that, at its core,
exempts threats "to do what one has a right to do," like, in most other
contexts, use puffery. 206 Perhaps it can't. It may just be that the Court
had the right instinct that, when puffery puts incomes on the line, it is
affectively jolting.
It is also the case that labor law is uniquely unsuited to a
transactional model of coercion. Unlike, say, contracts, 207 NLRA
doctrine is saddled with section 8(c)'s muddy speech allowances,
inherent power disparities, historical hostilities to signs on sticks, and,
especially, the intensely personal sensitivities people attach to their
jobs. As a group, these factors skew transactional analyses of suspect
conduct in directions that lead to bad or even bizarre results. Thus,
section 8(c) means that the boss's claims that union members are
back-stabbing scum, or, "if you strike for more money, I'll replace you
permanently," are non-coercive in a legal way but, because it's a
mortgage-sustaining job, worsen choice positioning every other
way. 208 Doctrinal inertia means picketing a neutral is utterly coercive

characteristics of fear . . . that is largely unrecognized by them"); id. at 174-77 (noting
voice-, facial-, gender-, movement-, and situational-based cues that can trigger fear
responses).
206 Sullivan, supra note 3, at 1444-45 (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 620 (1969)).
207 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 177 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) ("If
a party's manifestation of assent is induced by undue influence by the other party, the
contract is voidable by the victim.").
208 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938)

(authorizing permanent replacement workers during strikes).
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legally but, if millennial shoppers and multi-sub-contracted delivery
drivers pay no mind, totally irrelevant to baseline choice in reality.
As Kathleen Kim has observed, coercion's traditional frames work
best for "direct and objectively identifiable threats of morally
egregious consequences." 209 But that's just not how work, generally,
works.
B.

Coercion as Fear

Of course, if framing coercion as an emotional experience puts
factfinders in a better position to detect it, the question becomes: what
feeling should they be looking for? The answer is fear, and the reason
is one-part experiential, one-part experimental. 210 For, just as all
parties know that emotions impact decision-making, they also know
that fear, specifically, is the most corrupting influence. And studies
support that instinct.
1.

A Three-Party Consensus

A leitmotif runs through coercion jurisprudence, the employer's
classic anti-union playbook, and the union's basic organizing
blueprint: identifying, provoking, and avoiding fear, respectively. In
NLRB decisions, "fear" is effectively a shorthand for "coercion." A
coercive speech will often be said to provoke "fears of possible trouble
with the" boss, "fears of job loss," or, if the campaign involves
undocumented workers, the "most intense fear . .
removal from
[your] very home[]."211 Similarly, the Board says pickets coerce
"employees, customers, or suppliers" by evoking "fear of retaliation if

209 Kim, supra note 61, at 468; see also id. at 460-61 (describing 'blurry line'
cases . . . subject to arbitrary assessments by the evaluator" better-suited to a more
psychological conception of coercion, which she terms "situational").
210 I am not the first to suggest that the essential component of coercion is the
emotion fear. Some early human trafficking cases relied on what Kathleen Kim has
termed the "'climate of fear' test," which "looked to the totality of the circumstances to
determine the level of subjective fear or psychological pressure the victims
experienced." Id. at 432-34. As Kim notes, the doctrine later evolved in part because of
questions surrounding whether courts could fairly and consistently identify claimed
fear. See id. at 434. Many of the same concerns are applicable to traditional labor law,
see infra Part IV.B.3, and for that reason I propose that coercion analyses be grounded
in the simpler and more measurable concept of control. See infra Part IV.C.
211 Deep Distributors of Greater NY, 365 N.L.R.B. 1, 20 (2017). Decisions may
even comment on fear's special power of persistence. See id. (noting that fear can
"remain indelibly etched in the minds of those who would be affected").
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the picket is defied." 2 12 Unions, for their part, coerce by scheming "to
instill fear of physical harm" in workers on the fence or not with the
program.21 3
For employers, fear is not the byproduct of persuasion, it is the
point. That's not an open secret; it's just open. 214 As sociologists Larry

-

212 In re United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 355
N.L.R.B. 797, 815 (2010) (citing NLRB v. United Furniture Workers, 337 F.2d 936,
940 (2d Cir. 1964)).
213 H. N. Thayer Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 1591, 1592 (1956).
214 There is the stand-by tactic of firing or laying off a single activist at the first hint
of organizing, which generates alarm by blunt force and intimidates whoever is left.
See JULIus GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT 27 (2010);
Larry Cohen & Richard W. Hurd, Fear, Conflict, and Union Organizing, in ORGANIZING
TO WIN 181, 184 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (calling this practice
"standard"). More telling are the subtler gambits tailored to provoke a low grade but
just as pervasive sense of foreboding. Organizational change, for example, is scary,
and employers do much to make the case that unionism is about welcoming an
entirely new order. See GETMAN, supra, at 30; see also Tina Kiefer, Analyzing Emotions
for a Better Understanding of Organizational Change: Fear, Joy, and Anger During a
Merger, in MANAGING EMOTIONS IN THE WORKPLACE 45, 45-69 (Neal Ashkanasy et al.
eds., 2002). Sometimes the case is theoretical and centers on culture. In a typical
missive, HarperCollins responded to a drive by explaining that a union would
"endanger" the "current feisty, free and open involvement of the entire staff." Cohen
& Hurd, supra, at 184-85. Just as often the case is made right before voters' eyes, with
video re-enactments of alleged contract rules that would force workers to ignore
customers, unexplained influxes of outside and aggressive supervisors, and the
corralling of employees into isolated meeting rooms at strange times. See, e.g., Becker,
Taking Aim, supra note 112, at 25-48, 42-44. These are all power-plays, and the
underlying message is futility: even if you win, you lose, because the conflict will be
permanent. See Cohen & Hurd, supra, at 183-84. And futility, it turns out, translates
into fear. See Linda J. Levine & David A. Pizarro, Emotional Valence, Discrete Emotions,
and Memory, in MEMORY AND EMOTION 37, 47 (Bob Uttl et al. eds., 2006) ("Fear is
elicited by the perception of a threat of goal failure and motivates thoughts and
behaviors directed toward avoiding the threat."); Winkielman, supra note 205, at 182
(citing Rajagopal Raghunathan & Michael Pham, All Negative Moods Are Not Equal, 79
ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 56 (1999)). Finally - and ironically
management's most fearsome move may be the workaround developed to combat
Gissel's rule that predictions need proof: they just keep consequences ambiguous.
Telling an assembly, "Who really knows what might happen, but you better think
carefully," is more unsettling than a forecast, because instead of struggling with a
specific claim from an openly biased source, it's shadow-boxing with every imaginable
outcome. See GETMAN, supra, at 27 ("IMlost employers 'imply really bad things are
going to happen if the union wins. You know - read between the lines."'). This
accounts for the counter-intuitive finding that the fewer details recalled about a
traumatic event the more personal and close in time it feels. See Clore & Huntsinger,
supra note 175, at 395 ("[Rlecalling more details (ten rather than two) made the
[Oklahoma City] bombing seem both more distant in time and less personally
important."); see also Litvak et al., supra note 178, at 290 ("[Wlhen someone feels
uncertain or lacks confidence about the cause of a negative event, she is likely to
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Cohen and Richard Hurd have stated succinctly: "[FIear is at the heart
of employers' union-avoidance strategies." 215
This is not lost on the union. When organizers are not rallying
workers, they are prepping them to deal explicitly with fear.21 6 The
technical term is "inoculation," 217 and the idea is to cushion
management's blows by choreographing the punches and demystifying
the fighting style. Organizers have seen the playbook, probably know
the consultants who wrote it, and, whether the issue is strikes, dues,
or lay-offs, have a ready parry. 218 "They aren't trying to inform you of
anything," an organizer may say to set an important theme. "They're
just trying to frighten you with everything." 2 19 When it works, the
union gets fifty percent plus one of the votes. When it does not, even
the most out-front activists will pull back and cite fear as the
justification. 220
The use of fear as a paralytic is equally clear in the union's attempt
to transition the setting's emotional valence from fear to anything else.
A United Food and Commercial Workers' ("UFCW") organizing
manual states that, "When dealing with a strong emotion like fear, we
need another emotion just as strong (or stronger) to overcome it." 2 2 1
experience fear ..
.
It is the uncertainty, ultimately, that is so chilling.
215 Cohen & Hurd, supra note 214, at 181; see also GETMAN, supra note 214, at 31
("Every employer campaign seeks to exploit employee fears of the consequences of
unionization."); Kimberly Phillips-Fein, How Employers Broke Unions by Creating a
Culture of Fear, WASH. POST. (Aug. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
in-theory/wp/2016/08/02/how-employers-broke-unions-by-creating-a-culture-of-fear/
?hpid=hp-no-name-opinion-card-f%3Ahomepage%2Fstory
(attributing low union
density to employer-created "culture[s] of fear").
216 A United Food and Commercial Workers ("UFCW") organizing manual says

this expressly: "Fear is a challenge that all workers have to overcome to be successful
in organizing a union." UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, UFCW
STEWARD TRAINING 2, http://memberpower.ufcw.org/files/2014/05/Steward-TrainingOutlines-Organize.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
217 Daisy Rooks, Sticking it Out or Packing it In?: Organizer Retention in the New
Labor Movement, in REBUILDING LABOR 195, 195-224, 278 n.7 (Ruth Milkman & Kim
Voss eds., 2004); see also Cohen & Hurd, supranote 214, at 193.
218 See GETMAN, supra note 214, at 30 (noting that the tactics "are sufficiently
standardized that skillful organizers can predict the substance and sequence ...
in
advance and rebut management's claims").
219 Id. ("Unions regularly criticize the employer's campaign, claiming that it was
designed to frighten and confuse.").
220 See Becker, Taking Aim, supra note 112, at 44 (describing how many of the
earliest and most confrontational activists during a campaign at Target soon "shied
from . . . public challenges for fear of retribution" after management's campaign
picked up steam).
221 UNITED FOOD & COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION, supra note 216, at 3.
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That turns out to be anger, which the UFCW believes "move[s] people
to act (not just react) in place of fear."222 For this reason, organizing
"how-tos" assume a bedrock state of fear and then counsel "getting the
person angry" by re-focusing on frustrations, "see[ing] and feel[ing]
the injustice[,] and then accessing [one's] own power to change it."223
Everybody's right. While fear scholarship is, like emotion science
itself, evolving, the conclusions already point in the same direction.
Empirically, fear moots rationalist appeals and artificially deforms the
choices people make in the very ways the law cares about.
2.

Corroded Workplace Choice

A sense of fear's choice-disrupting processing can be spotted even in
its tentative definition, which can be boiled down to "an awareness,
based on the raw materials available, that danger is near or
possible." 224 From there, it is no surprise that fear's principal action
tendency is flight.2 25 So, if a worker had coffee with an organizer, a
222 Id. Indeed, research shows that where fear enervates, anger, which pivots
around a sense of injury, a wrongdoer, and will to fix it, motivates. See Litvak, supra
note 178, at 290; see also Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 205, at 180, 183 (describing
anger as a "counter-emotion" that "may provide a counterweight to fear's inhibitory
tendencies").
223 Lisa Fithian, Getting People Involved, ORGANIZING FOR POWER, ORGANIZING FOR
CHANGE, http://organizingforpower.org/getting-people-involved/ (last visited Sept. 25,
2018). Empirical work supports links between anger, activism, and support for
unionization. See Roger D. Weikle et al., A Comparative Case Study of Union
Organizing Success and Failure, in ORGANIZING TO WIN, supra note 214, at 197, 197211, 204, 208-09 ("[T]he workers expressed anger in response to experiencing recent

decreases in pay or benefits . .

.

. These workers were also ready to take aggressive

action after calculating the net benefits of unionization.").
224 Fear's definition, like all emotions, is a scholarly work-in-progress. Joseph
LeDoux's account of struggling to define it is instructive, but he concludes that the
given phrasing "ties [everything] together." Joseph LeDoux, Coming to Terms with
Fear, 111 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sa. 2871, 2876 (2014); see also Joseph LeDoux,
Searching the Brain for the Roots of Fear, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 22, 2012), http://
("Scientists generally
opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/anatomy-of-fear/,
define fear as a negative emotion state triggered by the presence of a stimulus . . . that
has the potential to cause harm.").
225 See Lerner, supra note 169, at 805 ("[F]ear triggers flight."); see also Nico H.
FRIJDA, THE EMOTIONS 72 (1986) (describing fear's action tendency as the "urge to
separate oneself from aversive events"); Robin L. Nabi, Exploring the FramingEffects of
Emotion: Do Discrete Emotions Differentially Influence Information Accessibility,
Information Seeking, and Policy Preference?, 30 COMM. REs. 224, 230 (2003) (describing
fear's "emotional goal" and "action tendenc[y]" as "protection through avoidance");
Gregory Berns, In Hard Times, Fear Can Impair Decision-Making, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6,
("Fear
prompts
2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/07/jobs/07pre.html
retreat."). Of note, "flight can also manifest itself in various other behaviors including
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supervisor quips "How was the latte?" and the worker gets scared, the
organizer may not get a follow-up and it may have nothing to do with
the quality of conversation. Foodies with the hottest reservations in
town might get spooked by protestors wrangling on a sidewalk nearby
and opt for delivery instead.
But fear has other, less tangible impacts on the choices of interest to
labor law that are just as distorting. One of its most heavily researched
appraisal tendencies is to make people magnify risk.226 A widely-cited

study conducted days after the 9/11 attacks found that those
experiencing fear (as opposed to mostly anger) estimated significantly
higher probabilities for an array of potential risks, including those

having nothing to do with terrorism, like getting the flu. 227 Fear, in

fact, tends to make the future feel generally uncertain and
uncontrollable, qualities which further bias preferences toward riskavoidant choices. 228
Consider the example of a company president thinking about
signing an agreement allowing a union to make a pre-approved
presentation to employees in a break-room. 229 Red carpet access might
legitimize the union or give tacit approval to complaints raised by the
campaign, but it might also generate positive media, a less contentious
atmosphere, or the possibility of extracting union concessions in
response. But add to the recipe a revelation that the union has just
tipped a reporter off to an ultra-luxurious corner office remodel that
could tarnish the folksy reputation that has built the president's
career. To the extent the president fears exposure, it is likely to
destabilize the old decisional matrix by inflating the agreement's
identified risks, spawning newly perceived risks, and shrinking the
probabilities of possible benefits. Ultimately, it is impossible to predict
'avoidance [or] freezing ('being paralyzed') . . . as the situation develops." KishGephart et al., supra note 205, at 170.
226 The seminal study is Lerner & Keltner, supra note 178, at 473, 485, 487.
227 See Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of
Terrorism:A National Field Experiment, 14 PSYCHOL. Sa. 144, 148-49 (2003).
228 See Lerner & Keltner, supra note 178, at 485; Litvak, supra note 178, at 297.
229 This scenario is not far-fetched. As noted, many modem campaigns operate
through ground-rules contractually agreed to by the parties. See Sachs, Despite
Preemption, supra note 36, at 1155. Allowing a union more workplace access than is
required by law is a common provision, and some agreements even detail the substance
of a union's or employer's communications to employees while on the property. See, e.g.,
L. M. Sixel, Hospital Worked with Union as Organizing Effort Unfolded, Hous. CHRON.
(June 1, 2008, 5:30 AM CDT), https://www.chron.com/business/article/Hospitalworked-with-union-as-organizing-effort-1604814.php (providing organizers workplace
access and limiting employer messaging to a pre-approved statement).
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how the calculus will play out - maybe blaming the renovation on
the Board of Directors, getting a jump on press coverage, and then
welcoming the organizers will end up feeling like the tamest option.
What is for sure is that the fear infusion will fundamentally upend the
math relative to the pre-revelation environment.
Risk pessimism could also be implicated for a worker hired to
replace strikers startled by a rally near the new job and forced to weigh
the risks of forging ahead (confrontation? ostracism?), versus
returning to the temp agency (lost paychecks? humiliation?). Here,
the fright may also function like a cognitive "highlighter" for other
potentially more acute threats. 230 Attention might zero-in, for instance,
on things held by strikers that could turn into a flying object, like
maybe a water bottle or, more ominously, an egg. Eyewitness
testimony scholars refer to this as the "weapon focus," finding that
frightening stimuli - real, described, or pictured - can monopolize
mental resources, especially memory, during an event. 231 Emotion

research has built on this phenomenon to show that the concentration
bias also boosts fear's intensity in ways that double-down on
irrationality. 232 An oft-repeated illustration is the strange fact that
people will pay more for insurance covering death from the scary but
narrow category of "terrorist acts" than for a policy encompassing the
much bigger but blander class of "all possible causes." 233 Applied to
the workplace, the effect means that strike testimonials or photos of
abandoned businesses are likely to be processed with such intense
scrutiny that trailing disclaimers, hedges, or spreadsheets will be
mostly irrelevant - and overall objectivity all but impossible.
Finally, fear stunts the choice most central to the NLRA as a whole:
whether to opt-into collective activity in the first place. It prompts an
uncooperative, defensive outlook at a time when the cause is trying to
assemble motivated and group-minded participants to get off the
ground. 234 And it skews perceptions of reality. A fear-induced
230 Levine & Pizarro, supra note 214, at 37-58.
231 Id. at 50.

232 See id. at 39, 50 (suggesting that the highlighter effect "increasels] the salience"
of threatening information); see also George Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The
Role of Affect in Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENcEs 563, 619-42 (R.
J. Davidson et al. eds., 2002) (stating that "lolne's mental image of a crash landing . .
is likely to be very different from one's mental image of a safe landing" and noting that
"probability weighting depends on the emotional impact of" such distinctions).
233 DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF FEAR 73 (2008).
234 See Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 205, at 163-67 (highlighting fear's role in
discouraging workers from speaking up at all in work settings); Zeelenberg, supra note
178, at 23 (finding that "fear decreased cooperation for" those with "a natural
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-

"mountains out of molehills" 235 effect has been shown literally
where standing on a skateboard at the top of a hill causes gross
overestimates of the incline compared to stable ground - and
figuratively, where fear reduces optimism and floods consciousness
with feelings of vulnerability and paralysis. 236 It would be hard to
come up with an outlook less suited to rights-assertion.
3.

The Measurement Problem (Redux)

The takeaway from above is that if the workplace coercion project
shifts from policing transactions to policing emotions, perspectives
from both the field and the lab suggest that the emotion factfinders
should be looking for is fear. Yet, the prospect of "looking for fear"
itself gestures toward a bigger challenge, which goes to coercion's
regulation and, of course, measurement. Because, even if an emotionbased conception of coercion makes analytical sense, and even if the
right emotion is fear, if "fear" cannot be measured accurately and
consistently, we are back at square one. Coercion's paradigm might be
updated, but its legal application may not be any better.
And, as it turns out, the notion of "measuring" the amount of fear
someone feels and then applying that conclusion to a labor law rule is
a problem. For example, a lot of speech that is protected under section
8(c) or that the law should obviously allow is frightening. Though it is
a fear-inducing thought, an organizer clearly needs to be able to warn
a worker that, without a counterweight, management is going to kill
the pension plan. There is also the matter of individual differences. 237
Unions like to use massive rat balloons -

fangs out, claws out -

to

publicize strikes or pressure neutral employers. 238 One person might
tendency to act pro-socially"). Here biology seems to play a role: "The most concrete
thing that neuroscience tells us is that when the fear system of the brain is active,
exploratory activity and risk-taking are turned off." Berns, supra note 225.
235 Clore & Huntsinger, supra note 174, at 395.
236 See Levine & Pizarro, supra note 214, at 48; Litvak et al., supranote 178, at 300.
237

See,

e.g., JEFFREY ALAN GRAY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FEAR AND STRESS 35 (1987)

(noting the "common-place observation" that people experience fear differently);

PETER N. STEARNS, AMERICAN FEAR: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH ANXIETY 4

(2012) ("Fear ...
is often an individual experience. Individuals also encounter fear
differently, depending, of course, on the provocation but also on individual
temperament.").
238 See Tzvi Mackson-Landsberg, Note, Is a Giant Inflatable Rat an Unlawful
Secondary Picket Under Section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1519, 1524-25 (2006). A Google image search for "Scabby the Rat"
provides numerous examples. See Scabby the Rate Images, GOOGLE IMAGES,
https://images.google.com/ (enter "Scabby the Rat" into the search query bar) (last
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find it scary, another person might find it hilarious, but the hilarity
might change if little kids are in-tow. Universal rules about fear's
connection to coercion, as even philosophers and the Supreme Court
have stated, are hard to come by. 239

There is another hitch. When it comes to work, fear is unavoidable.
That is not because employers are intrinsically unkind, unpleasant, or
difficult. It's because of their authority. Advocates and some judges
have long considered the psychic effects of workplace authority
figures, 24 0 but we now can prove that "authority" translates into fear.
Recent organizational studies scholarship reveals that in hierarchical
settings, status differences are scare triggers. 24 1 The effect's origin
remain up for debate, 242 but one early consensus is that the response is
automatic and present even in ostensibly non-threatening
circumstances, like asking a question or making a suggestion. 243 As the
formative study concluded, "merely occupying the role of a dominant
group member (boss) - along with the authority cues surrounding
the role - is enough to sometimes signal 'threat' and activate a fearbased response."24 4 Follow-up projects have shown that when asked to
explain why a supervisor is intimidating, workers point more often to
viewed Oct. 16, 2018).
239 See Kim, supra note 61, at 433-34 (detailing the Supreme Court's skepticism of
early human trafficking cases linking "climate[s] of fear" to psychological coercion
absent "objective criteria").
240 See, e.g., NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d. Cir. 1941) (Hand, J.,
dissenting) ("Language may serve to enlighten a hearer, though it also betrays th
speaker's feelings and desires; but the light it sheds will be in some degree clouded, if
the hearer is in his power. Arguments by an employer directed to his employees have
such an ambivalent character; . . . so far as they also disclose his wishes, as they
generally do, they have a force independent of persuasion."); Becker, Union
Representation, supra note 43, at 565 ("[T]he central issue that employer workplace
campaigning raises is not one of speech or discrimination, but rather one of
authority."); James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 832 (2004) ("When an
employer delivers a series of forceful messages that unionization is looked upon with
extreme disfavor, the impact upon employees is likely to reflect their perceptions
about the speaker's basic power over their work lives rather than the persuasive
content of the words themselves.").
241 See generally Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 205, at 174 ("[People] will readily
experience fear in situations in which hierarchy is salient, as in most work
organizations.").
242 The explanations encompass evolutionary (high-status means relational and
resource power), learned (bosses always lash out), and socialized (from childhood,
culture, or the job itself) factors. See id. at 173-79.
243 See id. at 173-75.
244 Id. at 174.
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the person's "place in the hierarchy" than "specific attributes of or

experiences with that boss."245 And while we often think of fear as

something naturally time-limited, emotion science confirms that
workplace fear can indeed persist and impact decisions over time. 246
C.

Regulating -

and Measuring-

Coercion Through Control

The upshot is that while fear may be the best description of
coercion, it may not be the best basis for regulating it. But if we start
from the premise that hierarchies make varying degrees of workplace
fear unavoidable, perhaps labor law should be less concerned with
identifying it and more concerned with mitigating it. And if we also
accept that when unions interact with others fear is less pervasive but
certainly possible, perhaps the law should focus not on mass
categories like pickets but the narrow instances where fright is most
likely to arise. The fix in both cases is the concept of "control." The
best part is, it's measurable.
1.

Control as a Fear Antidote

In the literature, control is "the belief that one has a response

available that can influence the aversiveness of an event." 247 Key terms

in that definition are "belief" - because whether someone actually has
an effectual response doesn't change control's effects and
"influence," which refers more to the perceived power to lessen an
unpleasant impact in the moment than to fundamentally alter an

underlying set of facts going forward.248 People appraise the amount of

-

245 Id. Interestingly, the authors note that while "those who work in hierarchies
attribute power . . to a superior's formal position . . [the] power is likely to be only
loosely related to the negative force a superior is actually able (or inclined) to wield."
Id. A worker's "sensing mechanism," in other words, is "set to detect threat of
dominant individuals without concern for accuracy." Id. This, in turn, creates a "low
threshold for activation." Id.
246 This is in large part because, at work, fear's "target or cause" management
is around all the time. Jean-Francois Coget et al., Anger and Fear in Decision-making:
The Case of Film Directors on Set, 29 EUR. MGMT. J. 476, 478 (2011); see also Martin P.
Paulus & Angela J. Yu, Emotion and Decision-making: Affect-driven Belief Systems in
Anxiety and Depression, 16 TRENDS COGNITIVE Sci. 476, 477 (2013) (stating that
emotions "influence the value and weight computation of available" choices and that
"these computations are dynamically adjusted based on the environment").
247 Pamela L. Perrewe & Daniel C. Ganster, The Impact of Job Demands and
Behavioral Control on Experienced Job Stress, 10 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. 213, 215
(1989).
248 See id
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control they have over a situation naturally and automatically. 249
Scholars have suggested, for instance, that in the presence of authority
we make "intuitive" judgments about the things we can probably get
away with versus the actions that are likely to lead to rebuke. 250
But for labor law purposes, control's most meaningful quality is that
it is a fear antidote. Where a threatening stimulus is even remotely in
the air, fear's intensity is mediated by one's sense of control over the
situation. In short, if perceived control is high, fear will be low; if
perceived control is low, fear will be high.251 The studies in this area
are colorful and telling. A great way to relax dental patients awaiting
the drill and other sharp objects? Give them a "stop" button that
confers absolute control over the spins, twists, and pokes. 252 In
experiments the button not only reduces fear before and during
procedures, it increases patients' tolerance for pain - even though
most subjects never actually use it.253 With or without a button,
doctors know that a mere warning about impending pain - the old,
"you may feel a little discomfort," trick - imparts a sense of
preparatory control that calms. 254

Various mechanisms underlying this effect have been developed in
the literature, but a theme seems to be that control translates into
feelings of self-agency or "-efficacy," which helps people cope with
fears and anxieties by building confidence that they can "minimize
maximum danger" through their own actions.25 5 This coping idea has
249 See Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 205, at 169; see also Perrewe & Ganster,
supra note 247, at 215 (suggesting "there may be an intrinsic need to control the
environment").
250 See RICHARD SENNETT, AUTHORITY 19 (1980) ("Of authority it may be said . .
that

it is an attempt to interpret the conditions of power, to give the conditions of control and
influence a meaning .... ), cited in Kish-Gephart et al., supra note 205, at 169.
251 See Robin L. Nabi, Discrete Emotions and Persuasion, in THE PERSUASION
HANDBOOK 289, 289-308 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002) ("Fear is
generally aroused when a situation is perceived as both threatening to one's psychical
or psychological self and out of one's control...."); Kish-Gephart et al., supra note
205, at 169 ("[T]he intensity of the fear experience is related to the degree of perceived
uncontrollability (i.e., the threat is seen as greater when uncontrollability is
higher).").
252 See ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 645-46 (1986).
253 See id. at 646.
254 See id. at 646-48 ("Signals that warn of something unpleasant are intended to
provide a kind of control by enabling one to anticipate discomfort and somehow or
other get ready for it.").

255 Here, I am blending Albert Bandura's pioneering work on control, self-efficacy,
and fear, see, e.g., Albert Bandura, Self-Efficacy Mechanism in Human Agency, 37 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 122, 136-37 (1982) ("[Plerceived self-efficacy operates as a cognitive
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been portrayed powerfully in a series of experiments involving one of
the more notoriously control-deficient settings, the nursing home. In
the most famous study, residents on two different floors were provided
with relatively subtle cues to either enhance or diminish their
perceptions of day-to-day control.256 The high control floor, for
instance, was told that, "You should be deciding how you want your
room to be arranged - whether you want it to be as it is or whether
you want the staff to help you rearrange it."257 The other floor heard:
"We want your rooms to be as nice as they can be, and we've tried to
make them that way for you." 258 Other signals were more direct. Those
on the high control floor got to choose whether to see a movie and, if
so, when. 259 They were also offered a choice of plants and told that it
was up to them to take care of it.260 Residents on the other floor were
assigned a "movie night" and handed a plant to be watered by staff.261

In the words of the eminent social psychologist Roger Brown, the
results of the study were "embarrassingly good." 262 Though both floors
tested equally at the start, after three weeks it was as if the high
control group had been switched with a team of vigorous, sociable,
and motivated nursing home all-stars. Relative to the other floor, they
spent significantly more time conversing with neighbors, interacting
with outside visitors, and talking with staff. 2 63 To statistically
significant degrees they also watched more movies and participated in
more activities, including a jelly-bean-guessing contest, by a ten to one
margin. 264 Amazingly, at the end of the study specialists judged every
mechanism by which controllability reduces fear arousal. . . ."), with the "[mlinimax
hypothesis," where control reduces fear because the person "attributes the cause of
relief to a stable, internal factor - such as his own response," as opposed to "some
unstable, external factor." Suzanne M. Miller, Controllability and Human Stress:
Method, Evidence and Theory, 17 BEHAv. REs. & THERAPY 287, 295 (1979). For a fuller
accounting of the mechanisms underlying control's impact on fear, see SHIRLEY FISHER,
STRESS AND STRATEGY 27-37 (1986) (describing various "control typologies").
256 See BROWN, supra note 252, at 651. For the original study, see generally EllenJ.
Langer & Judith Rodin, The Effects of Choice and Enhanced Personal Responsibilityfor
the Aged A Field Experiment in an Institutional Setting, 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.

PSYCHOL. 191 (1976).
257 BROWN, supra note 252, at 651. For the full speeches, see Langer & Rodin, supra

note 256, at 193-94.

supra note 252, at 651.
See id. at 652.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 653.
See id.

258 BROWN,
259

260
261
262

263
264

See Langer & Rodin, supra note 256, at 196-97.
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high control resident but one psychologically "improved," while the
psyches of seventy-one percent of the low control residents had
worsened. 265 The coping advantage remained during an eighteenmonth follow-up, at which point the low control floor reported double
the number of deaths. 266
Now, employees are not nursing home residents. But control's
emotion buffering qualities have also been found to extend to a variety
of workplace-specific frights, anxieties, and stressors. 267 Perceived
control reduces fears associated with downsizing, lightens the mood in
stressful environments, improves productivity, sharpens performance,
and ramps up worklife satisfaction overall. 268 As one early study
summarized, "there is rather compelling evidence that, in general,
control is associated with a myriad of positive outcomes." 269 The
bottom-line is that where it exists, fear dissipates, and that is true onthe-job and off.
While this is an important insight, how it might translate into a
workplace regulatory system is not necessarily obvious. Answering
that question starts with one of control's less academic virtues: people
relate to it in ways that are measurable.
2.

Toward a Control-Based System of Coercion Regulation

Here's a thought experiment: think back to a time in your life when
you felt fear, but something happened and the feeling lessened. Maybe
peers were pressuring you to try a roller-coaster, and then you spotted
265

Id.

See BROWN, supra note 252, at 652-53.
See, e.g., Mark E. Johnson et al., Moderating Effects of Control on the Relationship
Between Stress and Change, 33 ADMIN. & POL'Y MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. RES. 499, 499 (2005) ("Several research traditions in organizational psychology
are based on the assumption that increased employee work control is associated with
better work performance and lower levels of stress."); E.J. Peacock & P.T.P. Wong,
Anticipatory Stress: The Relation of Locus of Control, Optimism, and Control Appraisals to
Coping, 30 J. RES. PERSONALITY 204, 218 (1996) ("[C]ontrol appraisals emerged as
better predictors of coping than optimism and [personality factors implicating
control] across all three stressors," including fears of unemployment.); Perrewe
Ganster, supra note 247, at 225 ("D jobs perceived as containing low levels of personal
control lead to psychological anxiety.").
268 See, e.g., Esther R. Greenglass & Ronald J. Burke, Hospital Downsizing,
Individual Resources, and Occupational Stressors in Nurses, 13 ANXIETY, STRESS,
COPING 371, 386 (2000) ("Present findings showed that high self-efficacy contributed
to lower distress in nurses who were experiencing hospital restructuring."); Johnson
et al., supra note 267, at 500 ("[Ilincreased worker perceptions of job control had
positive effects on mood, task performance, and task satisfaction.").
269 Perrewe & Ganster, supra note 247, at 215.
266

&

&

267
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the "closed for maintenance" sign. Or you were starting school in a
new town, but you learned the smiley neighbor down the street was in
your grade and you asked her to sit with you at lunch on the first day.
Or you feared giving a speech, but then you started practicing on a
sympathetic audience.
In these and many other scenarios, the emotional turning point is
related to a changed or emergent sense of control. Life was happening
"to us," and it felt scary. But then something intervened - or you
intervened - and it suddenly felt like life was happening "by us."
Things still felt scary, but maybe not as much. While research suggests
these sorts of control perceptions can arise internally and relate to
personality characteristics, 270 they can also be linked to concrete
changes in circumstances: the shuttered rollercoaster meant spins on
the gentler Tilt-A-Whirl; the lunch invitation avoided an anxious
search for a free cafeteria seat; the test run proved it was possible to
stand behind a podium without shaking.
That we can point to or even tell stories about these sorts of controlbased pivots is, from a regulatory perspective, key. It means that the
control analysis is fundamentally external, and that other people, like
judges, can sometimes survey the landscape for control too. I use the
word "survey" advisedly. Whether it is a supervisor's speech or a street
corner protest, assessing the interior life of the onlookers is not the
Board's strength. But the agency can take a hard look at a setting and
literally count the options for coping. How the agency might translate
that insight into an administrative procedure, and then incorporate it
into eighty-some years of existing precedent, is mapped out below.
a.

The Two-Step ProceduralApproach

i.

Step One: Credible Fear

A fear-based approach to identifying coercion, and a control-based
approach to regulating it, would have two procedural steps. First, the
General Counsel ("GC")271 would need to establish some factual basis
270 This is known in the literature as "locus of control." See, e.g., Maureen J.
Findley & Harris M. Cooper, Locus of Control and Academic Achievement: A Literature
Review, 44 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 419, 419 (1983) ("Locus of control refers
to a person's beliefs about control over life events. Some people feel personally
responsible for the things that happen to them. . . . Others feel that their outcomes in
life are determined by forces beyond their control (e.g. fate, luck, and other
people).").
271 The NLRB
General Counsel operates independently from the Board's
adjudicatory functions and is responsible for prosecuting unfair labor practices. See
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for the Board to conclude that whoever was allegedly coerced credibly
feared something relevant to the Act's prohibitions. 272 The "relevancy"

limitation is important. A consumer might avoid a storefront
demonstration for fear of appearing on the evening news, and a
checkout clerk might fear co-workers' ire if she skips the organizing
meeting, but the NLRA does not regulate exogenous workplace risks,
and it protects standard social scorn. Instead, the GC would be
looking for the sorts of fears the Board has always policed. In an
8(a)(1) context, that is a credible fear of employer backlash for
organizing activities. For section 8(b)(1)(A), that is fear of violence,
also in retaliation for section 7-related conduct. 273 In section 8(b)(4)
scenarios, that is business disruption or, for those approaching the
scene, "confrontation in some form."2 7 4

As discussed previously, while the Board has sometimes opined on
the presence or impact of emotions on workplace choices, the moves
are tentative and halting. Given that, but especially acknowledging the
varieties, vagaries, and individual differences in emotions, as a
practical matter this would be a light burden and a light inquiry. But
since fear is the very substance of coercion - the engine and the
insides of irrational decision-making - establishing its existence is
indispensable theoretically.
In the usual course, the showing would be through testimony. At
work and in an 8(a)(1) context, this would likely be mechanical, with
the investigating Board agent eliciting an affirmation of felt fear and its
generally The General Counsel, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/general-counsel (last visited Sept. 18, 2018).
272 Step One is envisioned as a credibility assessment to ensure that the party
subjectively experienced fear. While this raises the possibility of a charge based on
fear that is genuinely experienced but unreasonable, or fear that is the consequence of
the person's unique sensitivity, it is unlikely such charges would survive the controlbased second step, which is objective. The Region would have little incentive to issue
a complaint based on unreasonable or highly particularized fears.
273 As noted, section 8(a)(1) violations require a nexus between employer threats
or punishments and union-related activity. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2018). Section
8(b)(1)(A), similarly, is not a "general police power covering all acts of violence by a
Union, but rather was intended to bring within its scope only such acts of violence as
were directed against the exercise . . . of rights protected by [siection 7." NLRB v.
Furriers Joint Council of New York, 224 F.3d 78, 80 (2d Cir. 1955) (referencing §
158(b)(1)(A)).
274 Here "confrontation" refers to the Board's most recent picketing formulation,
which, considers it a "necessary condition." In re United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners
of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 355 N.L.R.B. 797, 802, 805-06 (2010) (describing
"non-picketing conduct to be coercive only when the conduct . . could reasonably be
expected to directly cause[] disruption . . . .").
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connection to employer conduct included in the standard affidavit. 275
However, even without a direct statement (one could imagine a subtle
threat causing a worker to instead say something like, "It made me
nervous," or "I lost some sleep over it"),276 the agency could roundout the showing with other evidence to meet the low bar. The agency's
expertise, longtime focus on the dynamics of economic dependence,
and reference to much of the social, management, and emotion science
evidence already discussed would allow it to construct a persuasive
case that fear was also present in some degree. 277
Testimony would play a more pivotal role in alleged violations of
8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(4), primarily to sort non-actionable social fears
from credible fears of violence or protest-related confrontations.
Someone may legitimately experience fear amid a doorstop
conversation with an organizer, but the GC would need to be
convinced the fear related to impending physical aggression and not
frayed relationships or lonely Saturday nights. Demonstrations,
likewise, can certainly be scary or disruptive, but the vibes at most
range from prosaic to convivial. People often bring their kids.
Once again, ambiguous or equivocal statements could be
supplemented with indirect proof or even social science. In generic
solicitation or protest situations particularized evidence would
probably be necessary, like an immediate history of local

275 By "mechanical," I mean that the agent is simply attempting to elicit the
surrounding facts plus a reflection on how the worker felt in the moment. It would
not require something like the nuanced and multi-faceted analysis of fear "credibility"
at issue in initial asylum determinations. See generally Scott Rempell, Credibility
Assessments and the REAL ID Act's Amendments to Immigration Law, 44 TEX. INT'L L.J.
185, 190-94 (2008) (describing this process).
276 Perhaps the most obvious example of a ULP where a worker might express an
emotion other than fear is the "promise of benefit." See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note
77, at 238-39. Obviously, a worker promised an unexpected raise or other improved
condition might be just as likely to express satisfaction or even delight. Tellingly, in
such cases the Board effectively applies a circumstantial analysis that usually detects
fear's presence nevertheless. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964)
(warning of the "danger inherent" in promised benefits in that workers are likely to
fear that "future benefits ... may dry up if [the employer] is not obliged").
277 Literature on the relationship between authority and endemic fear, examined
above, would be particularly relevant, see supra notes 240-46, as would work by Peter
Cappelli and other industrial relation scholars who have called the prevailing mode of
workplace governance the "frightened worker" model. PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL
AT WORK 131 (1999); see also Michael M. Oswalt, The Right to Improvise in Low-Wage
Work, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 1012-14 (2017) [hereinafter The Right to Improvisel
(canvassing studies, including ethnographies, depicting fear as a modern management
style).
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demonstrators getting aggressive or that a worker and an organizer
coach rival Little League teams and once nearly came to blows.278
ii.

Step Two: Control Options

Ultimately, the low burden's effect will be to funnel most complaints
to the much more important, and substantive, second step. Here, the
Board's analysis is objective. The second step requires the agency to
put itself in the shoes of the allegedly coerced employees, employers,
or consumers and ask: how much control over the situation did they
have? Put another way, what were a reasonable person's options for
coping with whatever was causing the fear by avoiding it or even
changing it? In most cases, the analysis will lead to something
measurable. Control's centrifugal dynamic will allow factfinders to list
the ways that a person might reasonably perceive or exert agency in a
stated scenario. More control options mean less fear, more rationality,
and less coercion. Fewer control options mean more fear, less
rationality, and more coercion.
The principle is reflected most clearly during work. Because there is
no control. It's an at-will world, so always the possibility of discharge
for any reason, even no reason, lurks. 279 From there, management can
order workers to do pretty much anything it wants, 280 authority that
never
278

ebbs

and always

See Kish-Gephart

flows.

281

Most salient,

et al., supra note 205, at 171,

though,

176

is that

(describing

how

"encounter [ing] relevant cues reminiscent" of past threats can trigger fear).
279 See generally Note, ProtectingEmployees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The
Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1933-37 (1983) (describing the origin
and operation of the at-will rule, along with its primary exceptions, which include
firings based on race, sex, age, and disability or in retaliation for reporting an
employment violation).
280 There are exceptions for things that would violate a clearly-defined public
policy, but in practice "the protection it extends to employees is minimal." Id. at 193637; see Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 805 (1946) (discussing employers' plenary
"ability to control their actions during working hours"). Amazingly, some of this
power extends to off-work activities. See Lewis L. Maltby & Bernard J. Dushman,
Whose Life is It Anyway - Employer Control of Off-Duty Behavior, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB.
L. REV. 645, 646 (1994) (discharging employees for "off-duty drinking, motorcycling,
cholesterol level, and obesity").
281 See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: How EMPLOYERS RULE
OUR LIVES AND WHY WE DON'T TALK ABOUT IT xi (2017) (depicting employers'
"arbitrary and unaccountable power over workers" as akin to dictatorship); see also
Becker, Union Representation, supra note 43, at 561 ("The realities of employer
authority and employee dependence .. . exist during the entire workday and in every
site at the workplace."). The NLRA provides a slim respite for pro-union solicitations
and distributions during break-times, but in many states breaks are not required and,
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meaningful control intercessions do not exist. Employees cannot just
inject agency onto the scene. They cannot skip the meeting, walk away
from the hallway lecture, or avoid the watchful eye. It's like every day
is the first day of school, but no matter what you do, the lunch seats
are always taken. It is true that if workers understand the law (a big
"if"), the NLRA does offer some options for push-back, but the
underlying right is tailored more to all-out, condition-specific protests
than to fixing how working time - including employer anti-unionism
- is structured. 282 Similarly, while the possibility of unionizing might
supply some sort of vague control perception, the risky,
confrontational, drawn-out work of doing it makes any initial, fearreducing benefits more theoretical than real.283
For this reason, where the second step prompts detailed analysis it
will again usually be in the section 8(b)(1)(A) or 8(b)(4) context. And
the relevant facts will be something like the answers to descriptive
questions one might pose after learning that a friend just had an
unexpected, even hair-raising, encounter: Were you surrounded? What
happened when you turned away? Could you have waited a few minutes?
Did you ask them to leave? Were you in danger? Could you have taken the
left on Elm Street instead? But, was there still a clear path to walk
through? Could you have crossed the street instead? The goal is to take a
snapshot of the allegedly coercive encounter and populate it with as
many realistic or reasonable options for coping as possible.
Asking the Board to search for - literally, count - realistic control
opportunities leads to a question of line-drawing. How many options
should be available before the Board deems a situation non-coercive? I
suggest one. That is, a coercive encounter means that the employee,
if they are, workers still do not get them. See The Right to Improvise, supra note 277, at
1008-112. The real options, particularly for many women and minorities, are
acquiesce to day-to-day humiliations or quit. See Catherine L. Fisk, Humiliation at
Work, 8 WM. & MARYJ. WOMEN & L. 73, 84-89 (2001).
282 Creating kinks in management's ability to direct workers this way or that
generally requires a flat-out refusal to perform labor, which opens the door to being
replaced. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). Actions
short of that are likely to be deemed an illegal "refusal ... to accept the terms of
employment set by the employer without engaging in a stoppage ..... Elk Lumber
Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 337 (1950). As the Board pronounced long ago: "We are aware
of no law or logic that gives the employee the right to work upon terms prescribed
solely by him." Id.
283 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. And as David Feller has stated, even
where successful, unionization still rests on "an acceptance of the authoritarian nature
of the employment relationship." David Feller, A General Theory of the Collective
BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663, 737 (1973); see also Story, supra note 15,
at 413.
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employer, or bystander had zero reasonable ways to cope with the
situation by avoiding it or actively lessening its impact. Cabining
coercion to situations of no control, instead of some other number, is
less scientific than an attempt to balance NLRA principles,
administrative competency, and the research about how people make
decisions. If the Act uses coercion to get at mental states primed for
choices that go against true will, and emotion science says that state is
fear, there is no clearer case of coercion than a decision made in fear
without any perception of control. Once even a single coping option
exists - walking around, shutting the door, waiting a minute - fear's
subjective intensity is mitigated, but the degree to which it is mitigated
is also instantly up for debate. As discussed, that is not a debate the
agency should be having. Fear with no control, instead of fear with a
little control, or some control, is the brightest, fairest line.
Arguably this is a rather narrow treatment of coercion, reminiscent
perhaps of rational basis review, where a law challenged under equal
protection is valid "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it."284 Substituting "facts" with "perceived control" where "it" is
putative coercion captures the analogous ease of fulfilling the test. It
would not be difficult, for example, to come up with a few coping
options for shoppers confronted by the currently legally coercive scene
of a few people standing in front of a neutral business with pickets.
Yet, in other ways the test expands coercion well past its present
parameters. During worktime, where there is no control, every
instance of employer anti-unionism is likely to be considered coercive.
Both views are basically correct. In the purest form, the two-step
proposal would surely limit 8(b)(4) violations, vastly expand the
universe of potential 8(a)(1) misconduct, and probably hold section
8(b)(1)(A) harmless. But "purity" is not a prerequisite for progress.
What the literature teaches about fear, control, and how they interact
can meaningfully inform how the Board thinks about coercion in the
future, even if the suggested two-step test does not become new black
letter law. This contingency is most likely to apply at work, in the
8(a)(1) context, where control's vanishing is so complete that the
proposal's value may come not from its direct application but from
how its underlying principles point to some control-based legal
or 8(b)(4) situations, more seamless
reforms. In 8(b)(1)(A)
application of the two-steps may be possible. The Article ends with
consideration of these possibilities, plus objections.

284

McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961).
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3.

Embedding Control-Based Regulation into Existing Coercion
Doctrine

a.

8(a) (1) and the Opt-Out Option

There are many ways the Board could start to incorporate control
principles into allegations of section 8(a)(1) coercion. The most
straight-forward would be to simply apply the two-step test. There
would be no suspense. With fear endogenous and control nonexistent, every credible charge, from an out-and-out threat to a note of
union disparagement, would come up coercion. Now, although this
direct approach is theoretically coherent, it is obviously not going to
happen. Even scholars who agree that work is per se coercive2 8 5 do not

advocate a speech bar, and courts would not allow it anyway.
Nonetheless, it is worth pushing the hypothetical a bit further,
because how employers might react in a world where the General
Counsel could justify 8(a)(1) complaints with evidence of a control
vacuum at work highlights the Board's secondary, more pragmatic,

285 This includes Alan Story and Craig Becker, though both hedge the point
somewhat. Story calls for recognition of work's "inherent coerciveness" and states that
employees are perpetual "targets of coercion," yet he also notes "'some play' in the
system" for rational choice. Story, supra note 15, at 412-14. His solution, though,
points to coercion's inevitability: "the judicial and policy-making exercise should be
one . . . of line-drawing and choosing which coercion . . is permissible and which
coercion is not." Id. at 414. Becker suggests, but does not fully assert, that "all
employer speech to employees during working hours, at the workplace, is speech to a
captive audience" and thereby coercive. Becker, Union Representation, supra note 43, at
600; see also id. at 561 ("The realities of employer authority and employee
dependence ... exist during the entire work day and in every site at the workplace.").
His answer is more "balanced access" to both pro- and anti-union speech. Id. at 593.
Ironically, the clearest expression of the notion comes from the NLRB itself, which in
its inaugural Annual Report labeled employer speech "poison [in] the minds of
workers" that, "even when it contains no direct or even indirect threat, is aimed at the
worker's fear of loss of his job." 1 NLRB ANN. REP. 73 (1936) https://www.nlrb.
The agency's
gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-1677/nlrbl936.pdf.
fix was management neutrality, something it vigorously pushed through the early
1940s, even in the face of express Supreme Court disapproval in 1941. Compare NLRB
v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941) (holding that an employer is "as
free now as ever to take any side it may choose"), with Am. Tube Bending, 44 N.L.R.B.
121, 129-130 (1942) (reaffirming a commitment to "complete [employer] neutrality
with respect to an election"). See also GORDON LAFER, NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR, AM. AN
AMERICAN
RIGHTS
AT
WORK
REPORT
2
(2007),
http://www.jwj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/Neither-Free-Nor-Fair-FINAL.pdf ("When employers speak
out, employees always listen carefully for even the subtlest hints as to what kind of
behavior will be rewarded or punished. . . . [S]uch -onversations are inherently
coercive . . . ."),
http://www.jwj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Neither-Free-NorFair-FINAL.pdf.
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path. Take a manager's opinion that "unions are a bad deal for
workers," something Gissel protects but that without more facts a twostep analysis might well find coercive. The employer could settle the
complaint, or it could try to ward it off by pointing to at least one
workplace policy that frees listeners to avoid or mitigate the message.
That might mean inviting the union in to offer rebuttals on company
time or allowing workers equal rights to solicit and distribute prounion messages during worktime.
The point is not that this scenario is realistic,286 but that instead of
newly parsing 8(a)(1) investigations into two steps, the agency could
itself scan the workplace for logical places to insert isolated nodes of
worker control right now. That is not going to eliminate fear or
necessarily limit overall coercion all that much, but it would enhance
rationality in certain settings and, more deeply, represent a first
attempt at fixing the existing chasm between control on-the-job and
off of it.

-

Where might the agency start? With a simple principle: the chance
to say "no." The power to opt-out, to insulate oneself from a situation
or conversation at the outset is control's "ground-zero." The right to
object to movie nights, plants, and cookie-cutter room arrangements
was the psychological elixir in the famous nursing home study. The
calming power of saying "yes" - or, "well, on second thought, no
thanks" - is why hospitals sometimes let patients administer their
own analgesics, with studies showing that a personal bedside button
can lead to less anxiety, less pain, and, often, less medication. 287
Not only is this insight easy to apply at work, it pervades a reform
that many have long pressed: making mandatory anti-union meetings
not mandatory. 288 This is partly because the tactic is so pervasive
286 That stated, "balanced access" and equity in the solicitation and distribution of
pro- and anti-union sentiments are ideas that others have indeed pushed. Becker,
Union Representation, supra note 43, at 593.
287 The vivid control-based rhetoric contained in a patient pamphlet produced by
the University of Chicago Hospital System underscores this effect. UNIv. OF CHI.
Hosps., A GUIDE FOR PATIENT-CONTROLLED ANALGESIA http://www.uchospitals.edu/
pdf/uch_015755.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2018) ("You are in control of your own pain
relief . . .. Use what you need to achieve a level of comfort, which only you can
decide."); see Pamela E. Macintyre, Safety and Efficacy of Patient-ControlledAnalgesia,
87 BRIT. J. ANAESTHESIA 36, 37-38 (2001) (detailing the effects of perceived pain relief
control).
288 See, e.g., Becker, Union Representation, supra note 43, at 592-93 (advocating the
reform as grounds for overturning an election); Matthew W. Finkin, Captive Audition,
Human Dignity, and Federalism: Ruminations on an Oregon Law, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 355, 364 (2011) ("Employers do have a federally conferred right to express
their views on unionization to their employees; but they have no federal right to
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workers contend with around eleven formal gatherings per campaign
- but surely also because in a world where coercion is ill-defined,
being forced to do something you do not want to do is the cleanest
case to make. 289

What emotion science adds to the discussion is a way to locate
forced listening at the extreme end of the coercion continuum,
providing the Board substantive justification to take it on as a worst
offender and try to fix it. Most already accept that the meetings are
singularly terrifying. Board Members do not use phrases like
"extremely devastating" to describe other lawful tactics; scholars
marvel at the sheer strangeness of being "forced to sit and listen to
opinions" inimical to one's own; the agency itself once deemed every
positive union right "meaningless" without a chance to avoid the
gatherings, which among other industrialized nations are legal only in
Turkey. 290 Here I am providing an empirical basis to confront captive
listening's equally singular decision-making consequences. For if
getting pulled from tasks and marched into conference rooms to learn
how upset management is about this "union thing" is the essence of
on-the-job impotence, 291 the right to respectfully bow out and keep
working provides some concrete control-based armor.
Of course, it's closer to chainmail than a chest plate. Even implicit
awareness that management disapproves of the choice plus the
absence of control in every other workday decision is enough to
perpetuate fear. There are also some deeper issues, including whether
an employer-convened meeting can ever be truly "voluntary." The
people who show up may be doing so only to avoid landing on an
compel attendance."); Secunda, Meetings Under the NLRA, supra note 101, at 405-06
(proposing the reform and noting that employees could "voluntarily choose to hear
the speech").
289 Paul Secunda, Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings in the
Post-Citizens United Environment, 120 YALE L.J. FORUM 17, 22 (2010) [hereinafter
Workplace Meetings] (emphasizing the tactic's pervasiveness); see also 2 Sisters Food
Grp., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 1816, 1825 (2011) (Becker, Member, dissenting)
("[I]nstructing employees to attend a meeting and informing them it is mandatory ...
threatens . . . discharge. This violates section 8(a)(1)."); Hartley, supra note 104, at 74
("[F]inding that the captive audience tactic violates section 8(a)(1) is
elementary . . . .").
290 Clark Bros., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 805 (1946); David J. Doorey, The Medium and the
"Anti-Union" Message: "Forced Listening" and Captive Audience Meetings in Canadian
Labor Law, 29 COMP. LAB. L.& POL'Y J. 79, 80 (2008) (discussing the "very
uniqueness" of the experience); Finkin, supra note 288, at 366-67; William B. Gould,
Independent Adjudication, PoliticalProcess, and the State of Labor-Management Relations:
the Role of the NLRB, 82 IND. L.J. 461, 484 (2007).
291 See, e.g., Leak Repairs, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 282, 283, 287-88 (1979).
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implicit "Against Us" list, so the amount of perceived control
conveyed by a non-attendance "right" could be quite minimal. 292
Similarly, forced listening comes in a variety of forms, 2 9 3 and the ease
of opting-out can vary. Management may call an all-staff meeting for a
specific time; a supervisor may spot a small group, walk up, and start
talking; or employees may suddenly find themselves in a one-on-one
conversation. Though each scenario is equally "captive" in that the
employee has no choice but to submit to the message, 294 it is one thing
for a worker to ignore an emailed, posted, or regularly-scheduled
meeting, and quite another to look a superior in the eye and walk
away.295
How an opt-out system should maximize perceived control given
the slippery nature of "voluntariness" is a hard question without a
wholly satisfactory answer. One option would be a rule that employers
inform workers that skipping an announced anti-union meeting or
exiting an impromptu group or one-on-one conversation where
unionization comes up will not lead to retaliation. 296 The Board
already requires similar assurances in three other situations where
employers want to discuss union-related issues with individuals, 297 So
'[f]ield studies indicate
292 As the dissent to Peerless Plywood stated: "When ...
how deeprooted is the feeling among workers that their future welfare depends upon
'not crossing the boss,' there can be no demonstrable difference in the impact of an
employer antiunion speech upon employees made on company time and the same
." Peerless Plywood, 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 434
speech made during the lunch hour .1
(1953) (Murdock, Member, dissenting).
293 See Hartley, supra note 103, at 94 n.161 ("There always will be employer
workplace speech that is on the margins with respect to whether it constitutes a
'captive audience meeting' ....
).
294 The

law

treats

these

three

scenarios

somewhat

differently.

As

"massed

assemblies" the first two fall under the Peerless Plywood proscription of forced
worktime listening 24-hours prior to an election. See Peerless Plywood, 107 N.L.R.B. at
429. Because the individualized encounter is not massed it avoids that rule but is
instead subject to a multi-factor coercion test. See Suburban Journals, 343 N.L.R.B.
157, 163 (2004) (analyzing a "one-on-one meeting" in an elections objections
context); see Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. 1176, 1178-79 (1984) (using "the totality
of the circumstances" to consider the coerciveness of individualized "questioning").
295 In fact, the Board has at times depicted an inverse relationship between group

size and coerciveness, though for a reason - an alleged tendency toward "free and
open discussion" in large gatherings - that bears little resemblance to modern captive
audience meetings. See Mead-Atlanta Paper Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 832, 834 (1958).
296

Paul Secunda advocates a similar approach in which employers could overcome

a presumption of coercion in captive settings by offering a series of disclaimers about
the purpose and expectations of the meeting. Secunda, Captive Audience Speeches,
supra note 103, at 128-29, 145.
297

These include: where employers want to ask workers to appear in pre-election
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this would create a blanket mandate for any sized group. Assurances,
however, enhance control perceptions only to the extent that workers
are genuinely "assured." Whether perfunctory statements from people
lacking any incentive to convey a sense of relief actually inspire
confidence is, at least, questionable.
The better approach would be to separate the conveyance of the
choice to opt-out from direct employer interaction, making it less
fraught. Having a list of workers who do not want to hear anti-union
speech, for example, would allow management to know not to even
ask. From a slip of paper placed in a modified ballot box, to a breakroom signature sheet, to a company website, there are several ways a
list like that could be generated. The best option would be something
created, maintained, and transmitted to employers by the NLRB itself.
At any time, employees could use a computer or smartphone to access
a standardized "opt-out" form on NLRB.gov, and employers or their
representatives would then receive an automated weekly or daily email
with an up-to-date batch of names. 298 Not only would this approach
avoid the specter of employer manipulation of the list, it would
deepen perceptual control by supplying an efficient, nonconfrontational, and, most crucially, reversible, on/off switch. Workers
could opt-out when they want, but they could also opt back in when
they want - and change course again after that. 299 Control, over the
most quintessentially fear-inducing factual setting in the unionization
life-cycle, would be theirs.

campaign videos, see Allegheny Ludlum Co. v. NLRB, 301 F.3d 167, 173-74 (3d Cir.
2002); where employers want to test a union's claim of majority support by polling
workers, see Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1062-63 (1967); and where
employers need employee testimony to prepare for an NLRB or court proceeding, see
Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770, 774-76 (1964). When employers question
workers about union allegiances, providing "assurances" about the non-threatening
nature of the inquiry helps disprove coercion but is not necessarily required. See
Stoody Co., 320 N.L.R.B. 18, 18-19 (1995).
298 Presumably employers would voluntarily provide an email address for this
purpose. If not, the first employee to fill out the form would prompt the appropriate
NLRB Regional Office to contact the worker's employer and request it. The NLRB
Process, NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process (last
visited Sept. 20, 2018) (noting that unfair labor practices begin with charges filed at a
regional office).
299 Some new employees, for example, might opt-out during their first week of
work as a matter of course but later, once organizers arrive on the scene, decide that
they are interested in gathe-ing more information from a different source and reverse
course. Of course, the effective date of these choices will be mediated by the frequency
of the NLRB-transmitted lists.
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-

An opt-out remedy is less extreme than it might seem. As recently as
the 1980s, workers had a right to be free from even causal questioning
about unions. 300 The post-Citizens United period has sparked
somewhat of a bottom-up renaissance in this line of thought, with a
number of states seeking to replicate Oregon's "Worker Freedom Act,"
which lets employees avoid political - but also labor and religious
gatherings at work. 30 1 Finally, a main consequence of an opt-out
regime could simply be to shift the primary persuasive medium from
spoken to written speech. Printed materials have long been an
employer favorite, but because letters, flyers, posters, and now email
have built-in avoidance mechanisms - namely, the trash can, delete
key, or just turning away - written propaganda already squares with
the proposed system and might become more attractive. 302 In effect,
employer persuasion could start to look like lawyer solicitation
"fraught with the
practices, where face-to-face encounters possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and over-reaching" - are
presumed to impair "reasoned judgment." 303 For state bar associations,
the fix is effectively an opt-in regime, where lawyers reach out with
letters, billboards, ads, and emails until someone requests in-person
contact. At that point, the "prospective client has exercised a degree of
control in the interaction . . . [and] concern about potentially
coercive . . . communications in a personal interaction is reduced." 304

300 See PPG Indus., 251 N.L.R.B. 1146, 1147 (1980) (finding "questions
to be coercive even in the absence of
concerning employees' union sympathies . .
threats" because it "conveys an employer's displeasure with employees' union
activity"), overruled by Rossmore House, 268 N.L.R.B. 1176, 1177 (1984); see also
NVF Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 663, 663-64 (1974) (dismissing "doctrine enunciated" in
Peoples Drug Stores, 119 N.L.R.B. 634 (1957), that "urging" employees "to reject the
union is in itself conduct which interferes" with free choice).
301 Secunda, Workplace Meetings, supra note 289, at 17, 23; see also HertelFernandez & Secunda, Citizens Coerced, supra note 7, at 12-15 (describing similar
proposals); Paul M. Secunda, Toward the Viability of State-Based Legislation to Address
Workplace Captive Audience Meetings, 29 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 209, 211 (2008)
Worker Freedom Act legislation would be preempted by
(considering "whether ...
federal labor law").
302 Per the Department of Labor, over seventy percent of campaigns are
"script[ed]" by anti-union consultants with a formula that includes "letters, flyers,
leaflets, and emails that the employer distributes to its employees." 81 Fed. Reg.
15924-01, 15926 (2016). NLRB v. Gissel Packing, labor law's seminal speech case,
itself involved numerous examples of written propaganda, including letters,
pamphlets, and cartoons. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 588-89 (1969).
303
304

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 7.3 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2013).
BOSTON BAR AsS'N ETHICS COMM., LAWYER REFERRAL SERVICE PROCEDURE

(2012), http://www.bostonbar.org/docs/ethics-opinions/opinion-2012-1.pdf?sfvrsn=4.
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8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b) (4)

-

Because allegations of union coercion arise in contexts where fear is
not necessarily inevitable, and control is sometimes possible, the twostep process applies most readily to sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(4).
It would have no impact on prototypical 8(b)(1)(A) situations
involving violence or threatened violence. 305 Where an organizer
assaults a worker or damages employee property, 306 fear
apprehending violence -

is self-evident, and control -

avoiding or

-

minimizing that danger - is already lost. Nothing changes if a punch
or smashed taillight is only threatened. The danger of violence
remains, and the looming, unpredictable nature of the threatened
conduct means the danger cannot be effectively controlled.
The steps have greatest value in closer cases. Take, for example, two
but not violently
instances of union officials heatedly "bump [ing] abdomens" with dissident members during confrontations
described in two separate decisions. 307 On those facts alone, the fear
step would be satisfied. Initiating physical contact easily establishes a
credible case that the employee might have feared impending violence
that could impact rationality over future union-related decisionmaking.
The analyses diverge, however, when the issue turns to control and
the employees' options for coping. In one instance an official "spotted"
the employee standing in front of the workplace, yelled obscenities
and, after walking over, "pushed him with his stomach" and "invited"
the worker to punch him in the face. 308 Very little about this situation
suggests the worker had even one reasonable option to mitigate the
fear. The most obvious fix -

walking away -

was seemingly

foreclosed by the official's interest in a physical altercation right there
and then. The goading is strong evidence of that. Absent some other
opening for effective relief from the tension, the worker's realistic

See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., New Power Wire & Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 71, 72 (2d Cir. 1965)
(assaulting employees); Cablevision Sys., 312 N.L.R.B. 487, 493 (1993) (damaging an
employee's van).
307 Compare Teamsters Local No. 115, 4-CB-9164, 2005 WL 513519 (N.L.R.B. Mar.
1, 2005) ("[The member] testified that, when he had approached the stage area after
the adjournment, others gathered around him and [the union official] bumped him
with his stomach. . . ."), with Laborers Local 806, 295 N.L.R.B. 941, 959 (1989)
("[The official] . . . pushed [the employee] with his stomach.").
308 LaborersLocal 806, 295 N.L.R.B. at 959.
305

306
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choices involve fear capitulation, not control, either by fighting or
disavowing his dissident status. 309 This is coercion.
But what if the same type of hostile bump occurred after the
employee "charged the stage" following a union presentation,
"uttering a stream of curses" and prompting a bystander to tell him to
"watch his mouth because children were present."310 That the
employee personally initiated and prolonged the incident is some
evidence that he felt himself to be in control of the situation, and
hence empowered to end the interaction. The better proof, though,
comes from the bystander's request, which shows others close to the
action ascribing the worker with primary agency over the encounter.
That is, they believed he had the power to de-escalate the scene and
could have even, presumably, left the auditorium. If so, that's one
option for control, and it's not coercion.
Like all control considerations, each conclusion is factually
contingent. A "bump" is not the same as a shove, which is closer to
per se coercive violence. In the second decision, the bump is described
as a "foreseeable reaction" to the employee's "charge," making it seem
like a defensive maneuver actually reinforcing a sense of the
employee's dominance over the scene. 311 And everything changes if
either bump is paired with a threat. Whatever the surrounding
circumstances, control quickly dissipates if the official adds something
like, "I'm going to get you later," suggesting violence is coming - by
ambush. 312
Ambiguous statements are obviously the toughest calls. Take the
real-life example of a section 8(b)(1)(A) complaint against an
organizer collecting signatures who told a worker, "we'll remember
the guys who sign the cards [and] we'll definitely remember the guys
who don't sign."313 That statement could certainly serve as the
foundation for a credible fear of violence, and the trial judge indeed
presumed the worker was "frightenfed] into signing a card." 314
The proposal here, however, would force a bit more evidentiary
digging, because there are facts that could call that conclusion into
doubt. "Remembering" non-signers could easily mean relational
309 As it turned out, the union official "broke it off, saying 'Ah, get the hell out of
here."' See id. at 948.
310 Teamsters Local No. 115, 4-CB-9164, 2005 WL 513519, at *1.
311 Id.
312 As it happened the official called the employee a "no-good Union member,"
evincing anger but not an obvious threat of violence. See id.
313 Cablevision Sys., 312 N.L.R.B. 487, 489 (1993).
314 Id. at 492.
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isolation, like cold shoulders or dirty looks. Most people would "fear"
those things, but those are social consequences of broken solidarity
and fallout that labor law permits. 315 The organizer's tone or personal
relationship with the employee could also impact the evaluation. 316
Again, the standard is low, but establishing some baseline credibility
that the worker feared conduct that section 8(b)(1)(A) guards against
-

namely, violence -

is required.

From there, the control step tries to identify one realistic way for the
employee to temper the fear. As noted, generally there is no escaping
the cloud of a bona fide threat of violence, but cryptic statements
without any retaliatory plan or details provide at least a slim chance of
pinpointing some control. In this case, for example, the organizers
were a rotating cast of union members from different businesses who
were volunteering their "spare time" to collect signatures.3 17 Often
interactions with workers occurred in public and seemingly by
happenstance, like leaning through a window "at a traffic light." 3 18
Those facts raise at least the potential for an argument that the worker
could reasonably avoid the organizer who made the statement - or
any of the organizers - going forward. This would especially be true
if the facility in question employed thousands in a huge metropolis
(here, New York City) or if the worker had asked the organizer to be
left alone and the organizer (even begrudgingly or rudely) affirmed the
request. Evidence that the campaign rarely attempted to make more
than one contact with any single employee would buttress the case.
Proof that the campaign also stationed organizers at the employee's
only work entrance would probably destroy it.
The analytical arc is similar in 8(b)(4) situations, but more
outcomes will depart from existing law. That's because the two-step
analysis cannot co-exist with a world where secondary picketing or its
"functional equivalent" is coercion "per se." 319 As is granted in all
315 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
316 The Board has recognized that tone is important in evaluating statements that

could be perceived as threats, see Manorcare of Kingston PA, LLC., 360 N.L.R.B. 719,
719 (2014) (rejecting alleged threats "made in a casual and even light-hearted
fashion"). It also accounts for how workers differentially perceive persuasion from coworkers, union staff, and friends. Phillips 66 (Sweeny Refinery), 360 N.L.R.B. 124,
129 (2014) (considering the existence of a "friendly relationship"); Mastec North
America, Inc., 356 N.L.R.B. 809, 810 (2011) ("Employees will ordinarily reasonably
discount the bravado of co-workers. . . .").
31
Cablevision Sys., 312 N.L.R.B. at 488.
318 Id.
319 Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 437-38 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) ("UInlike picketing [other conduct] ... is ordinarily not coercive and
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other substantive areas, picketing is not necessarily scary. 320 To the
extent the Board can find a bystander or employer who credibly attests
to being afraid, 321 the fear is not necessarily uncontrollable. You might
be able to go around it, use a different entrance, walk right through it,
or even ask, "So, what's everyone upset about?" The key inquiry is
thus not about "symbolic barrier [s] ,"322 but literal barriers: totally
blocked entrances; impenetrable streets and sidewalks; or bystanders
surrounded in every direction. Activity, in other words, the Board
might call "mass picketing," a term with "no specific or categorical
definition" but that generally involves big demonstrations in small
places without access, in, out, or around. 323
The close cases are again the most illuminating. As for the fear step,
a much-discussed scenario involved a costumed "Grim Reaper"
leading a "prop coffin" around a sidewalk in front of a hospital to
3 24
publicize malpractice suits impliedly linked to non-union labor.

Death is, obviously, a touchy subject around hospitals, and in the
abstract it is natural to assume, as the court reviewing the temporary
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) injunction did, that patients, families, and on-lookers
were alarmed. 325 But the record shows that should not have been
assumed. Besides total disregard, the most common reaction to the
Reaper appeared to be people walking "up to . . inquire about the
purpose of the demonstration." 326 One passer-by commiserated with
the union and added a story about her own husband's shoddy medical
treatment, while another complained about the procession to a

.

therefore does not run afoul of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)."); see also Kentov v. Sheet Metal
Workers, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases); supranote 136 and
accompanying text.
320 Sheet Metal Workers', 491 F.3d at 436 (picketing any non-labor grievance is
"constitutionally protected and cannot be considered coercive").
321 At least in theory, picketing is synonymous with "confrontation," which is
potentially scary. In re United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No.
1506, 355 N.L.R.B. 797, 802 (2010).
322 See Sheet Metal Workers', 491 F.3d at 438.
323 Elec. Workers, UE Local 1150 (Cory Corp.), 84 N.L.R.B. 972, 1007 (1948); see,
e.g., Cablevision, 312 N.L.R.B. at 492 (describing a "large number of demonstrators
who converged on a small area"); Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1103 (1960) ("2,500
pickets . .. in front of the . . plant moved in a double line along the sidewalk across
the driveways and plant entrances, in both directions for two city blocks.").
324 Sheet Metal Workers', 491 F.3d at 432.
325 See Kentov v. Sheet Metal Workers' Ass'n, 418 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir.
2005) ("This activity could reasonably be expected to discourage persons from
approaching the hospital . .
326 See id. at 1262.
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security guard, but only because he "did not think it was
appropriate." 327 None of this suggests a fear of confrontation. 328
An older decision also involving another unconventional protest can
make the same point about the fear inquiry, but from management's
perspective. There, several neutral retailers might reasonably have
feared some sort of business disruption after spotting a hoard of union
members suddenly walking through the door. In each case, it turned
out to be a "group shop-in," where members swarm check-out aisles
with small items paid for in change or large bills.329 The court, viewing
all facts interchangeably, had "little difficulty" labeling the tactic itself
"coercion-based." 330 But, in fact, the credibility of claimed fear could
have varied wildly. One protest involved fifty members in a Costco, a
massive wholesaler that stocks thousands of items across four football
fields of warehouse-space. 33 1 Its check-out process is famous for
"lightning speeds."33 2 Other actions involved up to 125 members, local
retailers with names like "Kappy's Liquors," and included evidence
that customers "discouraged by the crush .

.

. left without transacting

any business." 333 Kappy's could probably satisfy step one, Costco
maybe not, but each neutral deserved individualized attention.
A good case to consider section 8(b)(4) control principles is Burns
Detective Agency, where between twenty to seventy union members
"marched" with handbills "in an elliptical path immediately in front of
the main [and only] entrance" of a trade show that had contracted
with unorganized ushers.33 4 Though unable to agree on whether the
conduct constituted picketing under then-current doctrine, the Board
concluded that "establishment of the line of march so close to the
arena entrance" made access "more difficult" and therefore was

327

Id.

Other facts, however, do. As the court noted, "a wife of a patient . . who had
died that morning became upset at seeing the demonstration and would not walk out
to her car" until it dispersed. Id. That testimony would be enough to satisfy step one.
329 Pye v. Teamsters, 61 F.3d 1013, 1016-17 (1st Cir. 1995).
330 Id. at 1024.
331 Id. at 1017; Karen Talley, Costco Targets Mall Space to Expand its Reach, WALL.
ST. J.
(Aug.
25,
2010,
12:01
AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052748703447004575449414252053370.
332 KLM, Costco Wholesale: A Warehouse Powerhouse, HARV. Bus. SCH.: TECH.
OPERATIONS MGMT. (Dec. 6, 2015), https://rctom.hbs.org/submission/costco-wholesalea-warehouse-powerhouse/.
333 Pye, 61 F.3d at 1017.
334 Serv. & Maint. Emps., Local 399 (William J. Bums Detective Agency), 136
N.L.R.B. 431, 432 (1962).
&
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"coercive to a very substantial degree."3 35 Absent signs or any request
that anyone turn back or avoid the area, the dissent called the scene
coercive "only in a sophistical sense," 336 gesturing toward what, based
on what emotion science tells us about decision-making, is the
important point: more difficult or not, everybody still had control over
the situation. A whopping 4,000 people - exhibitors, arena officials,
concession workers, contractors, and others - walked straight
through the ellipse and into the arena during the protest. 337 A
"number" of invited customers apparently perceived so many entry
options that they "mistook the line of marchers" for a special
admissions queue and literally joined the procession.3 38
Not only is this enough perceptual and real control to mitigate
whatever fear the march initially sparked in on-lookers, consumers,
and employees, it raises one of the more obvious control options for
employers: waiting it out. A neutral employer might fear activism of
any type or size, but if the only real impact is annoyance,33 9 doing
nothing until people go home can be a genuinely stabilizing choice.
This is especially true where all signs point to a short protest. A highrise management company may get spooked by chanting in the lobby,
but if the crowd's demand is simply to deliver a letter, finding
someone acceptable to receive it is real control.340 Activists handingout flyers to seated diners may also provoke fears of disruption, but if
delivered quickly and methodically, the restaurant's control over the
situation may not be much different than dealing with persistent
panhandling on an outdoor terrace. In fact, simply asking protestors to
leave can, if effective, itself be a powerful form of control. A union
official, for example, was conspicuously present during the "shop-ins,"
which, following managers' complaints, lasted about as long as the
average errand. 341
335 Id. at 436-37.
336 Id. at 441.

337 Id. at 432; cf. Kohler Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1103 (1960) (describing "'belly to
back' picketing" where a "double line of pickets would close any space in the line").
338

Serv. & Maint. Emps., 136 N.L.R.B. at 437.

See S. Mich. v. Unite Here, 939 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Ill. 2013), rehearing
en banc denied ("'[Cloercion' has been interpreted as placing the neutral's business in
jeopardy.").
34
See S. Mich. Ave. Ass'n v. Unite Here, 760 F.3d 708, 721 (7th Cir. 2014)
("lT]he Union is permitted some initial entry onto private property so it may convey
its views to the decision-makers of a secondary .... ).
341 Two of the shop-ins lasted a total of forty-five minutes, start to finish. Pye v.
Teamsters, 61 F.3d 1013, 1017 (1st Cir. 1995). The record did not disclose the length
of Costco shop-in. Id.
339
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Going Forward

The preceding is only a sketch. The essentially infinite array of
employer-employee, union-employee, and protest interactions make
accounting for how a fear-based conception of coercion, and a controlbased model of regulation, would fully integrate into the law difficult.
But emotion science can assist, even if integration is something less
than full, because its insights offer real data about the nature of
rational choice. So even without rigid imposition of a "two-step
process," if adjudicators start thinking about coercion by zeroing-in on
a shopper's description that "there was no way out," or worker's
statement like, "I was scared he'd snap if I'd turned away," progress
has been made. An incremental development like that is not
unrealistic. As explained, the Board references "fear" all the time in
implicit, if not sometimes open, acknowledgement of the emotion's
corrosive impact on choice. 342 When 8(b)(4) decisions highlight
things like "[nio traffic was blocked" or "pedestrians were not
obstructed or challenged," the agency is, perhaps without realizing it,
already relying on the mental mechanics of control. 3 43 At base, this
Article offers a theoretical and practical road-map to one-day formalize
those intuitions.
E.

Objections

Many objections to the use of fear and control in labor law are
possible. A primary one might be that "fear" and "control" are
themselves vague constructs, so using them to identify and measure
coercion will lead to decisions no less contestable than existing
doctrine.
While it is true that fear and control are not exactly quantitative
benchmarks, they nevertheless bring clarity to the law of workplace
coercion. Initially, and as noted, fear is undeveloped theoretically but
still a familiar concept in labor law. That track-record, combined with
the Board's "special function of applying" the law "to the complexities
of industrial life" 3 44 suggests that the agency is adequately equipped to

Supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
343 Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 433 (D.C.
342

Cir. 2007).
34
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975); see Michael Z. Green,
The NLRB as an Uberagency for the Evolving Workplace, 64 EMORY LJ. 1621, 1628-29
(2015) (describing the NLRB's "prominent experts" who are well-suited to decided
"challenging workplace questions at the front line").
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consider whether a worker's claim to have, for instance, feared
violence as an organizer approached is at least somewhat credible.
But even if not, the actual legal violations hinge on subsequent
control assessments, and here two important distinctions with current
law emerge. First, control discussions are generally factual and
therefore amenable to the type of proof judges are best suited to parse.
A question like whether drivers could exercise some modicum of
control upon spotting a protest next to a neutral's parking lot would
bring photographs, videos, and vehicular berth requirements into play.
The GC could ask a witness: "Okay, so you got startled - did
anything prevent you from just driving in?" Disagreements may still
arise, but the fights would be about traffic flows and second entrances,
not picketing essences or normative judgments about protest etiquette.
Second, regulating coercion with control swaps the very nature of
legal coercion from something airily related to the metaphysics of
rationalism to what we now know is how a driver might actually decide
whether to shop at the store or not: was there a reasonable way to
mitigate the fear, or was flight the only option? The ultimate outcome
may match the result reached under the Board's current approach, but
the justification will finally say something authentic about "coercion."
Procedural concerns may also be raised. Today coercion is
presumed in an array of scenarios, while step one requires testimonial
evidence of fear and asks the Board to examine its credibility. The
suggested approach is cumbersome, burdens the GC with identifying
witnesses willing to talk about their feelings, and upends law. Those
complications, however, must be weighed against continuing to apply
rules that are either assuredly wrong (e.g., picketing is inherently
coercive; captive listening is inherently not); possibly wrong (e.g.,
"facially benign or beneficial" benefit promises are coercive);345 or so
obviously correct (e.g., explicit threats and assaults are coercive) that
satisfying the first step would not be onerous.
And, importantly, the fear showing puts those and other
questionable existing norms to the test in ways that could, over time,
reform them. Take Randell Warehouse, which considered whether
unexplained union photographing of concerted employee activity is

3
Charles C. Jackson's and Jeffrey S. Heller's 1982 article argues that many
coercion presumptions "lack empirical support, dispense with the need for litigated
proof, and are difficult to defend. . . ." Jackson & Heller, supra note 70, at 3-4. Their
specific proposal takes aim at the "per se presumption that even innocuous promises
and grants coerce employees . . . ." Id. at 21, 66-67; see also id. at 59-60 & n.245
(describing the Board's "'objective standard' approach" to employer threats).

1662

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 52:1585

"inherently coercive." 346 Applying the analysis applicable to employer
recordings, the majority said absolutely.34 7 The dissent, after
considering power differentials and whether a union's motive for
videotaping employees in public might differ from an employer's, said
only if employees otherwise "have some specific basis for fearing the
union."34 8 The arguments were spirited, but it was a theoretical debate
that didn't have to be. Everyone would have benefitted from the
General Counsel's attempt to solicit testimony on workers' fears. A
failed search would have undercut the majority's perception of
automatically coerced workers, while testimony like, "they said they'd
be watching me," would have helped the dissent advocate for its
narrower rule. No matter what, the Board would have gotten closer to
figuring out how coercion works or doesn't work when unions tape
workers.
Other concerns might relate to the proposal's second-order effects.
For example, either because it's not scary or easily dodged, steps one
and two counsel that a standard picket is not coercive. Yet, the statute
itself makes no less than twelve direct references to picketing under
the precisely opposite assumption. 349 This seemingly leads to a
friction. However, harmonizing the two positions requires only that
the Board redefine picketing to encompass conduct that is both fearinducing and without escape. As noted, that scenario is already
captured by previous NLRB discussions of so-called "mass
picketing."35 o
Finally, were the Board to acknowledge the absence of control
during the workday and, as a result, implement the section 8(a)(1)related "opt-out" regime recommended in Part IV.C, questions may
arise regarding how the employer's remaining written and voluntary
communications should be analyzed. My suggestion would be to take
Gissel's emphasis on the coercive power of dependence more literally.
Economic dependence is, in effect, a state of diminished life control.
So, speech should be viewed with an eye toward the severity of that
346 While Randell Warehouse arose in an election objections context, the dissent
assumed its holding also applies to section 8(b)(1)(A). See Randell Warehouse, 347
N.L.R.B. 591, 602 (2006).

Id. at 599-600.
348 Id. at 601.
347

349 The references are packed into three provisions: section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and its
proviso; section 8(b)(7)(C), see supra note 137; and section 8(g), which limits
picketing at health care facilities.
350 See Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, Local 15 v. NLRB, 491 F.3d 429, 432 (D.C.
Cir 2007)
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dependence in each circumstance. 351 And that should be a highly
factual, even individualized analysis focused on how easy it would be
for the employee to exit the relationship. That may require the Board
to delve into new kinds of investigatory work on the front end, like
asking about student debt, needed car or house repairs, or
newborns. 352 It should certainly involve some analysis of local
economic conditions, such as alternative job prospects given the
employee's skills, experience, and interests. 353 All of that helps
highlight, as Gissel counsels, cases of maximum economic
dependence, but it also, as emotion science dictates, highlights cases
of minimal employee control.
CONCLUSION

Adjudicating coercion does not have to mean making a policy
choice; judges just need a good measuring stick. The metric will come
with a better sense of how coercion scrambles judgments, and it's
increasingly clear that this is related to how people allegedly
influenced were feeling at the time. In the workplace, everyone seems
to agree that the feeling that matters most is fear. At base, this Article
has argued that labor law should take this consensus seriously and
351 Cf. Wisconsin Bearing, 193 N.L.R.B. 249, 256 (1971) (equating employees'
economic sensitivities with the employer's "real control over employment
conditions").
352 A helpful model is Kathleen Kim's notion of "situational coercion" in human
trafficking. See Kim, supra note 61, at 461-74. Kim locates situational coercion within
frameworks concerned with "constrained choice sets" but with a greater emphasis on
"all the circumstances of the case, including the worker's vulnerabilities and the
power inequality between the worker and the employer." Id. at 461. She suggests that
relevant vulnerabilities "include such things as irregularized immigration status,
cultural and linguistic isolation, poverty and impoverished dependent family
members, youth, and illiteracy." Id.
353 The best decisions, like Bancroft Manufacturing, already do this:
The setting . . . is in point. The employees of this relatively large industrial
firm, in a predominantly rural county, would reasonably be expected to be
particularly sensitive to any suggestion or hint that the plants might be
closed. The Company was providing industrial employment to hundreds of
previously untrained farm workers and small-town residents, who would
have little opportunity in the county for such employment elsewhere.
See Bancroft Mfg, 189 N.L.R.B. 619, 624 (1971). Most decisions do not. See, e.g.,
Unifirst Corp., 346 N.L.R.B. 591, 598 (2006) (Liebman, Member, dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for analysis "inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
admonition that we must assess an employer's statements based on how economicallydependent employees will likely understand them").
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then distinguish between the myriad of possible fear-based
interactions using the more measurable concept of control. In this
way, the law can both honor coercion's content and squarely regulate
its existence at work for the first time.

